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ABSTRACT — Public lands law in this country has been gridlocked for a decade at the intersection
of democracy and ecology. The public is still led to believe that the “conservation” versus
“preservation” of our discrete, bounded parcels of public land is the central political issues and
that what must happen for one set of values or another to triumph is that one or another
faction capture those lands parcel-by-parcel and put them under its preferred legal regime.
Experts and activists have transitioned from this philosophy to the open-textured, inclusive
notions of “ecosystem” and “adaptive” management on which everyone agrees in the abstract
but not in application. The public’s faith in its pluralist administrative state is very much
contingent upon its faith in professional expertise, though, even as this whole arrangement
becomes increasingly incompatible with any truly “ecosystemic” approach to public lands.
Indeed, while active management and “ecological restoration” are probably truer frames of
reference for public lands today, the only way these can even possibly frame a progressive
conservation agenda will be from the bottom up. Thus, I argue that public land management
agencies are facing a dilemma if they hope to respond both to ecological reality and
democratic accountability. They are facing this dilemma most immediately in their several
legal duties to generate formal, comprehensive plans for the lands they administer by which
they must protect biodiversity at the same time they serve a diverse public according to the
terms of almost a dozen different enabling statutes.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the most significant critique of public lands law in a decade, Professor Robert
Keiter challenged the half-dozen federal agencies managing public lands today to merge
two very different kinds of values: those of democracy and those of ecology.1 While
some of these values overlap and/or are only partially dissonant, they create one
unavoidable contradiction in the management of public lands: democracy has always
carved nature up with legal boundaries while ecology has always denied their integrity.
The potency of Keiter’s challenge is therefore obvious, as the long-range planning duties
of the Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service, and other land management agencies are
showing with increasing clarity today. But this article argues that the gridlock in which
public lands law sits will only worsen unless and until a more decentralized approach to
its undoing is taken.
From 1982-97, “urbanized” land in the United States increased by 47% while
population grew by only 17%.2 Projections are that another 60 million housing starts will
occur in the United States by 2030.3 As a culture we are “land hungry,”4 even though it
is increasingly evident that our alterations of the landscape have been and will be one of
the principal causes of biodiversity loss.5 With half of all the Endangered Species Act’s
listed species having 80% or more of their known occurrences on private land,6 the role
1

See ROBERT B. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE: ECOSYSTEMS, DEMOCRACY, AND AMERICA’S
PUBLIC LANDS (2003).
2
William Fulton, et al., The Brookings Institution, Who Sprawls Most? How Growth Patterns Differ Across
the U.S. 1 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/fulton-pendall.htm .
3
Frank W. Davis et al., Renewing the Conservation Commitment, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY: RENEWING THE CONSERVATION PROMISE at 296, 305 (Dale D. Goble et al. eds, 2006) (hereinafter
“ESA AT THIRTY”).
4
Georgette Chapman Poindexter, Land Hungry, 21 J.L. & POL’Y. 293 (2005).
5
See generally REED F. NOSS & ALLEN Y. COOPERRIDER, SAVING NATURE’S LEGACY: PROTECTING AND
RESTORING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1994).
6
Davis et al., supra note __ at 304. While it is true the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. § 1531
et seq., “is concerned with two variables in the context of species preservation, the amount of species and
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of public lands in the protection of biodiversity is in flux at a time when conservationism
itself seems rudderless.7 The active management of federal lands for the protection and
restoration of habitat is a cornerstone of any effective biodiversity strategy, surely.8 For
“[i]f biodiversity protection is confined to the ESA, the best case outcome will be
maintenance of an “emergency room” strategy.”9 But what forms such management
should take, and on which public lands, are now very open questions in a political system
that delegates authority to agencies who, in turn, confront the organized, internallydisciplined, and issue-driven.10 “Ecosystem” approaches are widely touted and rarely
taken.11
Several federal statutes, such as the National Wildlife Refuge System
Improvement Act of 1997 (“NRWSIA”),12 direct their agencies to protect habitat and

the amount of species habitat,” Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059,
1066 (9th Cir. 2004), the protections the statute provides for privately owned habitat “may slow but cannot
prevent the accelerating, pervasive erosion of native species and ecosystems from the American
landscape.” Davis et al., supra note __ at 306. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
7
See MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY (1997); Michael Shellenberger & Ted Nordhaus, The Death of Environmentalism: Global
Warming Politics in a Post-Environmental World (2004), available at
http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of_Environmentalism.pdf
8
See Richard J. Fink, The National Wildlife Refuges: Theory, Practice, and Prospect, 18 HARV ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (1994); NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __ at 129-77; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and
Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, ___ (2002); Frank W. Davis et al., Renewing the
Conservation Commitment, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra note __at 296.
9
Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative Decision Making, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra note __at 212, 215.
10
See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 106-42 (1998); see also Steven P. Croley, White House Review of Agency
Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821 (2003). Even those optimistic about
participation and transparency in the administrative process view it mostly as the domain of tightly
organized interests. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1, 82-92 (1997).
11
The concept itself has certainly stimulated more philosophizing than productive research. See FRANK
BENJAMIN GOLLEY, A HISTORY OF THE ECOSYSTEM CONCEPT IN ECOLOGY: MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE
PARTS (1993). On the potential negatives of such concepts, see Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
12
Pub. L. No. 105-57, 111 Stat. 1252 (1997). NRWSIA is very similar to public lands statutes enacted in
the 1960s and ’70s. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
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provide for use of the land all while remaining transparent and accountable.13 Yet this is
highly improbable even under the Property Clause (perhaps the strongest of federal
authorities to protect nature),14 partly because the federal government has so scattered a
lands portfolio15 and partly because its expert agencies are now constantly enmeshed in
bitter conflict.16 This article takes up Keiter’s challenge to make a somewhat
unconventional argument. The argument is that the scale and scope of human influence
on North America’s ecology, coupled with the low priority assigned most of that ecology
in national politics, make rational, top-down management of public lands necessarily
ineffectual, both for identifying desirable ecological conditions and for pursuing them.
“Habitat” can, in this connection, be thought of as any aspect of nature that makes
possible the life of a particular organism, species, and/or species assemblage.17

13

“One of the most emphatic ecosystem conservation directives ever written by Congress is the NWRSIA
mandate to “ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the system are
maintained.”” Vicky J. Meretsky, et al., New Directions in Conservation for the National Wildlife Refuge
System, 56 BIOSCIENCE 135, 136 (2006). But this statute also required that the Secretary of Interior
evaluate the “uses” of wildlife refuges and, where appropriate—and “after an opportunity for public
comment”—minimize or prohibit those uses deemed incompatible with “the conservation, management,
and . . . restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats within the United States.” 16
U.S.C. §§ 668dd(d)(3)(B), 668dd(a)(2). Establishing such incompatibilities through legal proceedings of
the sort, though, is something apart from stewardship and expert management altogether. See infra notes
__ and accompanying text.
14
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (“[W]hile the furthest reaches of the power
granted by the Property Clause have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that
‘[t]he power over public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’”); see generally Peter A.
Appel, The Power of Congress ‘Without Limitation’: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of
Private Property, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2001); infra notes __ and accompanying text.
15
See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 80-126; Robert B. Keiter, Biodiversity
Conservation and the Intermixed Ownership Problem: From Nature Reserves to Collaborative Processes,
38 IDAHO L. REV. 301 (2002).
16
General critiques to this effect go back decades. See, e.g., Joseph Sax, Helpless Giants: The National
Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239 (1976). I have elsewhere argued that
biodiversity preservationists are confronting a massive strategic reorientation given these basic limitations
of the federal system. See Jamison E. Colburn, Localism’s Ecology: Protecting and Restoring Habitat in
the Suburban Nation, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. __ (2006).
17
In this sense, habitat is indistinguishable from biodiversity itself. See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note
__ at 30-31. Moreover, it is indexed directly to the subject organism, species, or species assemblage,
making “habitat functionality” the better concept for capturing those parts of the world to be conserved,
preserved, or restored for the sake of biodiversity. See CHARLES J. KREBS, ECOLOGY: THE EXPERIMENTAL
ANALYSIS OF DISTRIBUTION AND ABUNDANCE 58-67 (3d ed. 1985); NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __ at
4

Importantly, though, “nature” and even a “state of nature” have been put opposite human
culture—opposite the progress of humanity—for the whole history of the liberal state.18
The distinction still orders much of our public lands law today, even though the science
of ecology has progressed (and humanity has swelled in size) to where it has become a
distinction without a difference.19 The 700+ million acres of public lands in the U.S.,
being as stressed, fragmented, and dispersed across so many biomes dominated by so
many different influences, are the product as much or more of humanity as they are of
nature.20 Thus, even if the national public had the will to devote every last acre to
habitat, it is far from certain that biodiversity loss would be halted or even significantly
slowed by public lands policy alone.21 Habitat and humanity, in short, are at an impasse.
What public lands lawyers should do about this is the question.
Part II traces the evolutionary path public lands law has followed to its present
stage of development. Part III argues that most of the legislation structuring public lands
law today is a function of that evolution and, in particular, the vocabulary of conservation
150-56. Humans, of course, make habitats: landscape alterations routinely benefit some species at the
expense of others—a process that, as more and more of the world is ‘developed,’ seems to be making a
finite number of superabundant species. See David Quammen, Planet of Weeds, HARPER’S MAGAZINE
(Oct. 1998).
18
See ANDRZEJ RAPACZYNSKI, NATURE AND POLITICS: LIBERALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HOBBES,
LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU 7-8 (1987) (“The hope that science would one day allow human beings to control
the natural world made them much more attentive to the relation between man and his environment, and
they came to view knowledge not as a form of disinterested contemplation, but as a tool in the human
productive effort, directed at the comfort and convenience of life.”); cf. John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 421, 422 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999)
(“When Hobbes addressed the contentious divisions of his day . . . the basis of his appeal was self-interest:
men’s fear of death and their desire for the means of a commodious life. . . . In a society fragmented by
sectarian divisions and warring interests, he saw no other common foothold for political argument.”).
19
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
21
As has so often been the case, this realization became clearest in studies surrounding the conservation
and restoration of particular imperiled species. See, e.g., Leonard F. Ruggiero & Kevin S. McKelvey,
Toward a Defensible Lynx Conservation Strategy: A Framework for Planning in the Face of Uncertainty,
in ECOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF LYNX IN THE UNITED STATES 5, 11-12 (Leonard F. Ruggiero et al.
eds., 1999). Legal scholars have long acknowledged these limitations of the federal public lands. See
generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1997); Holly Doremus,
Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 325 (2002).
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Progressivism created. Finally, Part IV considers the prospects for a new vocabulary in
public lands law, a vocabulary rooted in restoration not preservation, and argues that its
prospects at the national level are bleak.

II. PROGRESSIVISM AND THE NATURE/CULTURE DIVIDE
Conservationism in the United States became an effective movement at the end of
the Nineteenth century, casting nature and humanity in a particular mold. It took shape in
the politics of “Progressivism”22 and today we are enduring its mistakes as much or more
than we are reaping its benefits. It was then that wilderness was first thought of as
something to be preserved,23 then that the enclosure and protection of “game” and game
22

“Progressivism” as an American era and philosophy is entrenched in many historical and ontological
conflicts, including conflicts over the nature of democracy. See, e.g., EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE (1973). At the
risk of an unnecessary entanglement in those disputes, I invoke it here as a turning point at which expert
and public opinion both began to “interpret the struggle for survival in terms of the species against its
environment” and rejected “fatalistic determinism by insisting that evolution had produced human
intelligence, which enabled man to control his environment for the benefit of all members of the species.”
Id. at 10. This conception of the possibility of progress through collective action remained “American,”
though, by continuing to take individual welfare seriously and by viewing “science” as “neither positivistic
nor deterministic, but, above all, pragmatic” in substance. RAPACZYNSKI, supra note __ at 277; cf.
PURCELL, supra, at 47 (arguing that Dewey’s attack on formal logic and metaphysics was a turning point
and that “[b]y the second decade of the twentieth century almost all American social scientists and a large
number of philosophers shared [a] hostility toward metaphysics and a priori reasoning.”).
23
The Adirondack Park was first proclaimed a “Forest Preserve” legislatively in 1885 and was protected as
forever “wild” by state constitutional amendment, now codified in Article VII, § 7 of the New York State
Constitution, in 1894. Louise A. Halper, ‘A Rich Man’s Paradise’: Constitutional Preservation of New
York State’s Adirondack Forest, a Centenary Consideration, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 194 (1992). Privately
owned lands within the proclamation boundaries of the Adirondack Park today constitute about 52% of the
total, see http://www.apa.state.ny.us/gis/colc0303.htm (current as of March 2003), making it still the largest
example of public/private “wilderness” in North America. Aesthetes familiar with both would not put the
Adirondack and Yellowstone parks in the same category, of course. But insofar as habitat functionality
goes, they are quite similar in their histories of disturbance and fluctuating species compositions. See L.
David Mech, Returning the Wolf to Yellowstone, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING
AMERICA’S WILDERNESS HERITAGE 309 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds, 1991) (hereinafter “THE
GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM”). These two legally proclaimed preserves constituted the
beginnings of America’s “wilderness cult”—a political and aesthetic movement that flourished throughout
the twentieth century, see RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (rev’d ed. 1973), at the
same time as (but quite separate from) the emergence of modern ecology. See DONALD WORSTER,
NATURE’S ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF ECOLOGICAL IDEAS (2d ed. 1994) (1977). This wilderness “cult” has
always been a collection of disparate conceptions of nature, culture, and the relationships between the
two—none of which have necessarily been informed by the sciences.
6

preserves first gained popular currency,24 and then that a professionalized class of
managers charged with the “sustainable use” of public lands first coalesced here.25
In its infancy early in the century, the science of ecology was little more than
what botanists did trying to identify “climax communities.”26 By the 1970s, though,
there had developed a broad and deep field of physical, chemical, and biological analysis,
integrating many sub-disciplines of zoology, paleontology, genetics, and biochemistry
together through the mathematics of probability and, eventually, of chaos theory.27 Its
object became the fact of natural diversity itself28 and that object quickly accentuated
homogenization as the end result of human industry and society.29

24

See JAMES A. TOBER, WHO OWNS THE WILDLIFE?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (1981).
25
See James L. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENV. L. 239 (1978); see also
WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, LUMBERJACKS AND LEGISLATORS: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF T HE U.S. LUMBER
INDUSTRY, 1890-1941, at 16-34 (1982). Indeed, professional forestry’s growth in America would remain a
catalyst in public lands law throughout the Twentieth century. See WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 315-30,
344-52; ROBBINS, supra note __ at 21-22; CLARY, supra note __ at 3-22; infra notes __ and accompanying
text.
26
WORSTER, supra note __ at 205-20. Even as ardent proponents of the “climax community” developed
their (somewhat Platonic) theories of equilibration and harmony in nature, though, “[c]hange upon change
became the inescapable principle of [the] science.” Id. at 210.
27
Simberloff, supra note __ at 25-27; WORSTER, supra note __ at 391-417, ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF
BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION AND INHERITANCE 829-58 (1982). The most noted
collection of papers cross-walking this progress in the field of ecology into the management of natural
resources was published in the late 1970s. See ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT (Crawford S. Holling ed., 1978). Eventually, “ecosystem management” became practically
synonymous with “adaptive management.” See Ronald D. Brunner & Tim W. Clark, A Practiced-Based
Approach to Ecosystem Management, 11 CONSERV. BIO. 48 (1997).
28
See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __ at 3 (describing this focus as now encompassing at least three
distinct levels: genetic, species, and ecosystem diversity). Growing out of the work of Mac Arthur and
Wilson in the late 1960s, the fields of ecology, evolutionary biology, and biogeography turned abruptly to
focus upon islands and what they could prove and disprove about extinction, colonization, and species
assemblage stability over time. See Robert J. Whittaker, The Importance of Islands, in FOUNDATIONS OF
BIOGEOGRAPHY: CLASSIC PAPERS WITH COMMENTARIES 931 (Mark V. Lomolino et al. eds., 2004). This
eventually became instrumental in the theory of speciation and ecosystem functionality generally. See id.
29
A paper written by John Terborgh and Blair Winter in 1979 argued that the species most susceptible to
human-induced extinction are those with naturally low population densities, large individual ranges, and/or
habitat endemism. See John Terborgh & Blair Winter, Some Causes of Extinction, in CONSERVATION
BIOLOGY: AN EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 119 (Michael E. Soulé & Bruce A. Wilcox eds.,
1981) (hereinafter “EVOLUTIONARY-ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE”). That paper built from one five years
earlier by Terborgh that sketched a similar hypothesis. See John Terborgh, Preservation of Natural
Diversity: The Problem of Extinction-Prone Species, 24 BIOSCIENCE 153 (1974). Large bodied
7

Land managers eventually came to this science, due in part to legal mandates for
an “interdisciplinary approach” to land management planning.30 But in Progressivism’s
reverence of ‘wild’ nature, coupled with its faith in expertise for efficiently exploiting
ordinary nature, there grew enormous obstacles to what might be called inclusive
conservation. Inclusive conservation is, by nature, integrative, uncoupled from
governmental power and bureaucracy, inherently participatory, unbounded, and, in
response to prevailing conditions, ecologically restorative.31 Its rejection from public
lands law represents a gathering threat to biodiversity through a contempt for ecology and
adaptive management. Sections A and B contrast the two major strands of America’s
public philosophy of land management: conservation and preservation. Section C
suggests how much they are alike.

A. The Forest Service: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number Over the Long Run
Since its inception in 1905 the Forest Service has been an agency imprinted to the
ideals of utilitarian use, i.e., the “conservation,” of land and the renewable resources it
mammals—and predators especially—were the obvious objects of the hypothesis. Today, unfortunately, it
has gathered a body of confirming evidence. See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
30
16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(b), 1604(f)(3).
31
Such a form of conservation is not necessarily synonymous with “ecologism” or “green” ideologies, see
ANDREW DOBSON, GREEN POLITICAL THOUGHT (3d ed. 2000)—nor with animal rights per se, see MARK
ROWLANDS, ANIMALS LIKE US (2002)—although there are overlaps. “Ecologism” is a political ideology
that not only “holds that a sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our
relationship with the non-human natural world,” id. at 2, but also “seeks nothing less than a nonviolent
revolution to overthrow our whole polluting, plundering and materialistic industrial society and, in its
place, to create a new economic and social order which will allow human beings to live in harmony with
the planet.” Id. at 9. Practitioners of what I call inclusive conservation view sustainability as having a
different opposite: the lack of community with nature. Community of the sort starts from an awareness of
“ecosystem services” (or “natural capital”), not just in cost/benefit terms but in a deeper awareness of how
vitally dependent humanity is on ecological functionality. See James Salzman et al., Protecting Ecosystem
Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001). Ultimately, such awareness
promotes better valuations of relationships in nature, a development that is proving to be as much
psychological as social. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward
Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Cultural and Psychological Perspective, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 423 (2003); WILLIAM R. JORDAN III, THE SUNFLOWER FOREST: ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION AND THE
NEW COMMUNION WITH NATURE (2003); see infra notes __ and accompanying text.
8

represents. This was and still is in obvious contrast to the “preservation” of land in some
natural or sylvan state.32 In one well-known statute, Congress delegated authority to the
executive in 1891 to “set apart and reserve . . . in any part of the public lands wholly or in
part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial value or not, as public
reservations . . . .”33 And Presidents did so, setting aside huge timber reserves.
This authority to “set apart and reserve”—before its repeal was secured by a
coalition of western Senators—was used by Presidents Harrison, Cleveland, McKinley,
and Roosevelt to reserve 150 million acres of forest.34 Roughly three quarters of the
modern National Forest System (“NFS”35) acreage in 159 national forests was set apart as
such by 1907.36 It was chiefly this land and later, similar set-asides that would be
managed for national timber markets in the coming century.37 As early as the 1920s,

32

See Huffman, supra note __ at 258-72; JAMES G. LEWIS, THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE GREATEST
GOOD: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY (2005) (hereinafter “THE GREATEST GOOD”). Each took shape as a result
of the other. See Louise Halper, A Rich Man’s Paradise: Constitutional Preservation of New York’s
Adirondack Forest, A Centenary Consideration, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193 (1992); Christine A. Klein,
Preserving Monumental Landscapes Under the Antiquities Act, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1333 (2002). On the
moral and political underpinnings of this divergence in Progressive politics, see Donald J. Pisani, Forests
and Conservation, 1865-1890, 72 J. AMER. HIST. 340 (1985). The “preservation” of land in this sense
propelled the National Park Service’s “organic act” as passed in 1916. See infra notes __ and
accompanying text. Also instrumental, though, was the rise of forestry as a professionalized approach to
land management and the interest the Forest Service took in forester education at several major universities.
See THE GREATEST GOOD, supra, at 42-49.
33
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1103, § 24, repealed by P.L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2791 (1976).
According to the standard narrative, this 1891 statute symbolized the reversal of more than a century of
federal land policy encouraging disposition of public lands into private ownership. This birth of the modern
“policy of retention” gradually consolidated into a lasting national consensus that the over 700,000,000
acres of land left in the federal government’s hands should stay there. See Leigh Raymond & Sally K.
Fairfax, Fragmentation of the Public Domain Law and Policy: An Alternative to the “Shift-to-Retention”
Thesis, 39 NAT. RES. J. 649 (1999).
34
HAYS, supra note __ at 47. On the inter-agency rivalry that arose almost immediately between the Forest
Service and the National Park Service (“NPS”), see infra notes __ and accompanying text.
35
The lands portfolio of the NFS of today is the result of a century of legislation, litigation, and
bureaucratic administration as between the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. See PAUL WALLACE
GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 563-606 (1968).
36
HAYS, supra note __ at 47; WILKINSON, supra note __ at 124-25.
37
See WILLIAM G. ROBBINS, LUMBERJACKS AND LEGISLATORS: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE U.S. LUMBER
INDUSTRY, 1890-1941(1982) (linking the creation and management of national forests to the market
dynamics and lobbying pressures of timber companies). An omnibus appropriations bill in 1897 provided
certain regulations for the reserves made under the 1891 statute. These provisions, see 30 Stat. 34-36, ch.2
9

detailed management plans were being prepared for every national forest producing
timber.38 Expert harvesting and long-term species rotation plans became the
organizational focus39 and the Forest Service gained a reputation for its knowledge,
professionalism, and efficiency as the public’s agent.40
The Forest Service’s authority to cultivate the forests under its administration
was, as is widely known, utilized to stunning effect.41 But the agency’s discretion to
align itself with particular industry segments represented its greatest power.42 The 1944

(1897), eventually came to be known as the Forest Service’s “Organic Act”—even though they make no
mention whatever of the Forest Service and, at the time, the Department of Agriculture’s Division of
Forestry (then already headed by Pinchot) had not yet been given jurisdiction over the forest reserves. See
GATES, supra note __ at 569-80. The 1897 statute required that “[n]o public forest reservation shall be
established except to improve and protect the forests within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for use and necessities of
citizens of the United States.” 30 Stat. at 34 (emphasis added).
38
FEDKIW, supra note__ at 15. Forest planning at this nascent stage was wholly informal and internal to
the Forest Service. As Congress had said in the so-called Organic Act, 30 Stat. 35 (1897), the agency was
to “make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate
their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction. . . .” Id. As early as
Pinchot’s tenure as Chief Forester, though, the Service had been classifying lands for their “highest” use
based on surveying and evaluation techniques set by headquarters (something the Roosevelt administration
began doing for the whole public domain). HAYS, supra note __ at 70-71.
39
As the Forest Service concentrated on producing timber as a merchantable, consistently delivered
commodity, i.e., to avoid glutting and price depressions, its expertise led it to view old-growth and slow
growing forests as “over mature” and better replaced by younger trees and faster growing species,
especially where productive soils predominated (e.g., in low elevations and flood plains). WILKINSON &
ANDERSON, supra note __ at 122-29.
40
See HERBERT KAUFFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (1960). A
reputation for such competence and integrity is, obviously, distinct from actual competence and integrity
and administrative agencies have always had powerful incentives to cultivate the former whatever their
claims to the latter. See DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY:
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862-1928, 284-89 (2001).
41
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 117-54; MICHAEL WILLIAMS, AMERICANS AND THEIR
FORESTS: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY 489-94 (1989).
42
“The conservation movement [of which TR and Pinchot were leaders] did not involve a reaction against
large-scale corporate business, but in fact, shared its views in a mutual revulsion against unrestrained
competition and undirected economic development. Both groups placed a premium on large-scale capital
organization, technology, and industry-wide cooperation and planning to abolish the uncertainties and
waste of competitive resource use.” HAYS, supra note __ at 266. “The crux of the gospel of efficiency lay
in a rational and scientific method of making basic technological decisions through a single, central
authority.” Id. at 271. See also CLARY, supra note __ at 68-80 (detailing the cooperation between Forest
Service and timber companies); FEDKIW, supra note __ at 15 (“Timber harvesting was seen as a tool for
increasing national forest timber growth and transforming national forests from “wild” to cultivated
forests.”).
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Sustained Yield Forest Management Act is indicative.43 In its purposes preamble, this
lesser known statute invoked “the benefits of forests in maintenance of water supply,
regulation of stream flow, prevention of soil erosion, amelioration of climate, and
preservation of wildlife . . . .”44 Yet, in its particulars, it authorized the Secretaries of
Agriculture (the forest reserves) and Interior (most other public timberlands) to formulate
“cooperative agreements” with timber companies whereby the companies could purchase
publicly owned timber through no-bid contracts as long it was “in accordance with the
provisions of sustained yield management plans formulated or approved by the Secretary
for the unit . . . .”45 The 1944 law also authorized the Secretaries to enter these no-bid
contracts where they found it necessary to the “maintenance of a stable community”
because those communities were “primarily dependent upon the sale of timber or other
forest products.”46 Their administration of such laws prompted comparisons to the worst
abuses of corporate self-dealing.47

43

58 Stat. 132, ch. 146 (1944).
58 Stat. 132, ch. 146, § 1.
45
58 Stat. 132, ch. 146, § 2.
46
58 Stat. 132, ch. 146, § 3. The authority was apparently little used. Huffman, supra note __ at 274-75.
This is probably due at least in part to a controversial contract done immediately with the Simpson Logging
Company in Shelton, Washington. The contract gave Simpson exclusive rights for 100 years and
effectively barred others from roughly 270,000 acres of public timber. THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note
__ at 107-08. The whole episode became an embarrassment, id., and a major catalyst in the eventual
erosion of public faith in Forest Service expertise. See DAVID A. CLARY, TIMBER AND THE FOREST
SERVICE 126-46 (1986).
47
Progressive Era investigations into the “lumber trust” by Roosevelt’s Bureau of Corporations resulted in
one of that agency’s biggest projects: a three-volume study documenting the startling degree of
consolidation within the timber industry in the Progressive era. WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 425-29.
Clearly, though, Progressivism’s rhetoric was often more radical than its institutional imagination. Cf.
ROBBINS, supra note __ at 11 (“The conservation movement . . . was not removed from the realities of the
political economy. . . . [I]n almost every legislative and regulatory “conservation” measure adopted at the
federal level, the Hand of Esau is apparent—the needs of America’s expanding industrial economy.”). By
the coming of the New Deal, “cooperation” with consolidated industry had become accepted practice even
among progressives and it was only the worst instances of governmental/corporate collusion that were
lifted into the public eye. See CARPENTER, supra note __ at 363-66. Still, the 1944 law’s “cooperative
agreements” apparently rose to that threshold. See supra note __.
44
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At the same time it was cultivating all the timber, the agency was supposed to be
balancing demands for grazing, mining, farming, and recreation.48 Its tunnel vision and
utter subordination of these other uses to timber planning, though, eventually grew so
notorious as to come to Congress’s attention.49 Indeed, by 1940 the Bureau of the
Biological Survey (one of the precursors to the modern Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”)) was being combined with other federal offices to create a central administrator
of the several “bird sanctuaries” and “game refuges” presidents had been setting aside
independent of the forest reserves.50 Congressional and presidential reservations of this
kind had come at an impressive pace even before FWS or the “National Wildlife Refuge

48

As the applied science of forestry matured, multiple use management became a series of stunningly
complex trade-offs. Cf. Marion Clawson, The Concept of Multiple Use Forestry, 8 ENVTL. L. 281, 282
(1978) (“Though the basic theory of multiple use of forests is apparently simple, perhaps deceptively so, its
application often grows complicated.”). Indeed, one of the earliest tests of administrative agency authority
came when the Forest Service’s predecessor, the General Land Office, issued regulations in 1897
prohibiting grazing on most of its forests out of concern for the effects on stand regeneration and soil
erosion. But by 1899, these rules were softened in response to hostility they had provoked among western
ranchers and livestock companies, ultimately being amended into a permitting system. CHARLES F.
WILKINSON & H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 99101(1987). Some not fortunate enough to receive permits just ignored the rules and grazed anyway. The
General Land Office was then forced to seek criminal convictions and injunctions, some of which were
rejected by the local courts hearing the cases. See, e.g., United States v. Blasingame, 116 F. 654, (S.D.
Cal. 1900) (invalidating 1897 statute making it a crime to violate any regulation created by General Land
Office as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). Eventually, the government sought and
obtained the reversal of these holdings, though. See Dastervignes v. United States , 122 F. 30 (9th Cir.
1903).
49
See CLARY, supra note __ at 183 (“By the early 1960s, clearcutting had altered many scenic landscapes,
particularly in the Northwest, and it appeared to be increasing . . . . More and more recreationists were
using the woods, and they were appalled by what they saw.”); see infra notes __ and accompanying text
(Bolle Report discussion).
50
CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note __ at 110. This early form of the Fish and Wildlife Service “existed for
some sixteen years without an organic act,” perhaps making it predestined to “muddle through” as an
agency. Id. at 111-25. In Leopold’s Game Management, published in 1933, he says of a “game refuge”
that it “is an area closed to hunting in order that its excess population may flow out and restock surrounding
areas.” LEOPOLD, supra note __ at 195. In the book, he includes maps of state refuges in Pennsylvania (a
total of over 100), id. at 199, and New Mexico (a total of almost 100), id. at 201, and considers their
efficacy from, among others, the criterion of distance between individual refuge units. Id. at 195-98. From
1900-1920, almost fifty federal refuges were reserved, including seven in Florida, eight in Alaska, and still
the smallest in the system, the 0.6 acre Mille Lac refuge in northern Minnesota. Lynn A. Greenwalt, The
National Wildlife Refuge System, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 399, 401 (Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978).
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System” (“NWRS”) emerged.51 The felt need for such “refuges” had to have stemmed at
least in part from a perceived incompatibility between habitat and utilitarian
“conservation.”52 Of course, each one of the sanctuaries and refuges were based on their
own political deals and, thus, on their own establishment terms and conditions.53 Early

51

“Benjamin Harrison’s 1892 order protecting Afognak Island, Alaska, as a “forest and fish culture
reservation” is probably the first presidential proclamation withdrawing public domain for wildlife
conservation.” FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 34. But it was not until the 1900s and 1910s that a collection
of sanctuaries and refuges arose by Roosevelt’s executive orders, later to be combined with the habitat
protections of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 755, ch. 128, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703711. See FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 34-36. On the different preservation and conservation constituencies
and their different roles in reserve, park, and sanctuary formation in this period, see HAYS, supra note __ at
189-98; NASH, supra note __ at141-81; Winks, supra note __ at 583-611. To oversimplify, the
constituencies and political deals underlying the many Progressive era reserve- and sanctuary-creations
were highly variable. As Professor Keiter himself described that legacy today, a century later, “[a]s a
result, both the origins and the justifications for our preserved public lands are as diverse as the landscapes
themselves. Yet there remains one enduring reality: nature preservation is an inherently a political matter.”
KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 195.
52
See TOBER, supra note __ at 210 (“By the late nineteenth century, a history of wildlife decline had
become part of the popular consciousness.”); THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 128-135 (describing
the forces pulling Forest Service policies away from managing lands for wildlife habitat, including ranchers
who demanded lethal predator control policies). The same powerful sportsmens’ organizations that led the
struggle to create Yellowstone and the Adirondack preserve for a time pushed to have Forest Service lands
put into “game” preserves. See TOBER, supra note __ at225-29. Pinchot was actively opposed, going so far
as to cross his and Roosevelt’s own Boone and Crockett club. See HAYS, supra note __ at 40-42, 196-98.
For this reason, the Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1222, ch. 257 (1929), was perhaps
the single most important source of habitat protection authority. It is commonly regarded as the first to
authorize federal acquisition of habitat as such. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 284 (3d ed. 1997). It served as the legislative authority for
wildlife refuge creation throughout much of the NWRS’s growth to its current size, being surpassed only
by the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 899 (1964), and
finally the National Wildlife Refuge Administration Act of 1966 (“NWRAA”), Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat.
926 (1966). See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
53
This remains a major impediment to the unified management of the NWRS today. As Professor
Fischman found in his in-depth study of the system, it was not until the 1960s legislation that the various
refuges and sanctuaries were even held to account to some set of common objectives or management goals.
FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 23-31, 46-53. “A major challenge for [FWS in administering the modern
refuge system] is to provide a unity of purpose for the System while preserving the individual
establishment mandates for the refuge units.” Id. at 79. Indeed, it was not until 1956 that Congress even
legislated FWS into existence—by splitting it in half. In the Fish and Wildlife Act of 1956, ch. 1036, 70
Stat. 1119 (1956), Congress ‘established’ the “Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife,” which was to be
separate from the “Bureau of Commercial Fisheries.” Id. at § 3(a). The former would be responsible for
those “matters” “relating to migratory birds, game management, wildlife refuges, sport fisheries and sea
mammals (except whales, seals, and sea lions) and related matters,” the latter would be responsible for
“commercial fishers, whales, seals, and sea lions and related matters.” Id. at §§ 3(d)(1), (2). This
legislation came at a time when the “fiction” of state ownership of wildlife was still honored, at least
nominally. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Federal regulatory authority was infrequently
asserted over wildlife as such, a political reality that only changed gradually as species loss became widely
publicized, see William S. Boyd, Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1289 (1970), and as the courts breathed new vigor into the Property Clause in cases such as Kleppe v. New
13

on, it was only nationally symbolic game species that received refuges.54 By the 1960s,
though, that threshold was rolled back to where Congress and the President directed FWS
to create refuges with sub-fee interests in farmlands laying in migratory bird flyways.55

B. Parks, Preservation and Progressivism’s Promise
Apart from all that,56 the National Park Service assembled a collection of trophy
landscapes that seemed to spring from a Hudson River School painting.57 The Park
Service’s “Organic Act” creating the National Park System (“NPS”) in 1916 validated the
preservationist splinter of the Progressive conservation consciousness.58 Yellowstone
may have started it all,59 but many followed throughout the Progressive era and after.60

Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976), and Minnesota ex rel. Alexander v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
See Appel, supra note__ at 75-120.
54
FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 172. In 1908, congress established the 18,000 acre National Bison Range in
northwest Montana, see Act of May 23, 1908, Ch. 192, 35 Stat. 267, and in 1914 the President established
the National Elk Refuge. See FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 168. The next year, Congress would, by
appropriating money for wolf eradication, bring into official existence the program for killing cougars,
wolves, coyotes and other predators—years after it had already become the Biological Survey’s most
widespread and bureaucratized mission—in part out of a mistaken belief that eradicating such animals
protected game. See MICHAEL J. ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE EXTERMINATION OF
WOLVES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WEST 78 (2005) (hereinafter ROBINSON, “PREDATORY
BUREAUCRACY”); see infra notes __ and accompanying text.
55
Fink, supra note __ at 13-20. On the federal-state antagonisms stirred by this mode of refuge creation,
see Murray G. Sagsveen, Waterfowl Production Areas: A State Perspective, 60 N.D. L. REV. 659 (1984).
56
The Departments of Interior and Agriculture have waged a jurisdictional turf war for control of public
lands since the beginning. It began with the reassignment of the forest reserves from the General Land
Office within Interior to the Forest Service within Agriculture in 1905. See JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE
AND DANIEL C. MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN: POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL
RESOURCE AGENCIES 109-10 (2d ed. 1996); HAYS, supra note __. But when the Forest Service’s
management of Washington’s Olympic peninsula angered many preservationists, they pushed successfully
to have the majority of the lands used to create Olympic National Park. CLARY, supra note __ at 102-03.
This and other like episodes powered the conservation/preservation rivalry even among professionals
beyond the agencies themselves.
57
On the inspiration painters such as Bierstadt, Church, Gifford, Kensett, and Moran provided Progressives
in their mission to save the monumental landscapes of America, see ANDREW WILTON & TIM BARRINGER,
AMERICAN SUBLIME: LANDSCAPE PAINTING IN THE UNITED STATES 1820-1880 (2002).
58
NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND, supra note __ at 145-81; Robin W. Winks, The National
Park Service Act of 1916: “A Contradictory Mandate”?, 74 DENV. L. REV. 575, 583-603 (1997)
59
See Robert B. Keiter, An Introduction to the Ecosystem Management Debate, in THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note __ at 3 (“Ever since the year 1872, when Congress designated
Yellowstone as the world’s first national part, the name Yellowstone has been synonymous with lofty
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The Park Service was organized to “promote and regulate the use” of the parks by “such
means and measures as conform to the[ir] fundamental purpose”: protection of “the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired
for the enjoyment of future generations.”61
These were extraordinary places and holding them in stasis was obviously
incompatible with conventional land use. But these preserves became, in the popular
consciousness, the green-lined opposite of the “working landscapes” of the forest
reserves, governed as they were by a “Use Book” and hopes of “yield” maximization.62
The Park Service became curator of special spaces that were to be experienced. Its lands
were being held separate from human cultivation (if not human presence63) for future

idealism and often heated controversy . . . . [D]ebate over how these lands are to be managed has escalated
into a symbolic issue of national and international significance.”).
60
With the Casa Grande Ruins in Arizona in 1889, the Chickamauga and Chattanooga battlefields in 1890,
Mount Ranier in 1899, and then, with the Antiquities Act in 1906 (empowering the executive generally to
reserve and set apart sites that would be added later to the NPS), many others, the treasures being guarded
were quickly amassed. See WILLIAM C. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 7-16 (1983).
61
Act of August 25, 1916, 39 Stat. 535, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1. By 1916 and even more so today,
though, the National Park System included sites of purely cultural relevance—bifurcating the agency’s
mission as between preserving nature and preserving culture. See supra note __. And while none of the
nineteenth century parks were originally created as wildlife habitat preserves per se, many NPS lands
quickly assumed the identity of a kind of “game” habitat protectorate. See NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra
note __ at 71-72. Of course, “game” was a small subset of “wildlife.” SELLARS, supra note __ at 108-32.
62
The “Use Book,” the forerunner to the modern Forest Service Manual (now a multi-volume compilation
constantly in flux with a continuous flow of circulars, guidance, etc.), was an internal collection of
headquarters’ directives issued to every Forest Ranger to guide land use decisions in the field. THE
GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 50; KAUFMAN, supra note __ at 95-102. By contrast, the Yellowstone
National Park Act directed the Executive “to make and publish such rules and regulations as . . . necessary
or proper . . . for the preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber, mineral deposits, natural
curiosities, or wonders within said park, and their retention in their natural condition.” 17 Stat. 32 (1872),
codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 21, 22. The regulations were also to “provide against the wanton destruction of
the fish and game found within said park, and against their capture or destruction for the purposes of
merchandise or profit.” Id. Later, after the “organic act,” this norm was generalized to cover the other
national parks as well.
63
“Development” of the tourism trade has been a hallmark of the NPS. See George Cameron Coggins &
Robert L. Glicksman, Concessions Law and Policy in the National Park System, 74 U. DENV. L. REV. 729
(1997). Professor Sax summed up the internal contradictions of this form of preservationism most
eloquently in considering the Jackson Lake Lodge in Grand Teton National Park. It “is a lovely resort
hotel, but it disserves the sort of opportunities the park ought to be stimulating. It is an attraction in itself,
15

generations.64 The Park Service became the first bureaucracy in the modern state meant
to put wild nature on a pedestal, to turn deliberately segregated parts of nature into the
sublime.65 Its installment as this steward ensured a budget line item, a professionalized
corps of administrators (just like the Forest Service!66), and a political constituency.67
They all coalesced quickly around the preserves and a Janus-faced notion of preservation
for the future by professional stewardship and legal boundaries.68 Progressives matched
their faith in the applied sciences of the earth with an inclination to draw lines on a map

with its fancy shops, swimming pool, and elegant restaurant. . . . If a place like the Tetons cannot attract
someone based on its own resources, [though,] then that visitor may not be ready for an encounter with
nature.” SAX, supra note __ at 88-89.
64
The Forest Service even reluctantly began a move to preserve wilderness on NFS lands, see infra notes
__ and accompanying text, mostly out of fear that it might lose jurisdiction over such lands to the Park
Service. See Roderick Nash, Historical Roots of Wilderness Management, in U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE,
WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 35 (USFS Pub. No. 1365) (1978).
65
Wallace Stegner’s 1960 letter to the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission captured this
idealization of wild nature (and identified it with the NPS) better than probably anyone else ever has.
“Something will have gone out of us as a people if we ever let the remaining wilderness be destroyed; if we
permit the last virgin forests to be turned into comic books and plastic cigarette cases . . . . We simply need
that wild country available to us, even if we never do more than drive to its edge and look in. For it can be
a means of reassuring ourselves of our sanity as creatures, a part of the geography of hope.” EVERHART,
supra note __ 94-95. On the formation of the Park Service’s identity around this idealization, see CLARKE
& MCCOOL, supra note __ at 69-91.
66
See CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note __ at 71 (“[T]he Park Service was created in the shadow of
progressive conservation which was . . . institutionalized in the Forest Service.”); Cheever, supra note __ at
634 (“The success Pinchot and [first Park Service Chief Steven] Mather enjoyed in their dealings with
Congress and the Cabinet had something to do with their promises, explicit and implicit, to do the difficult
job of striking a balance between preservation and use.”).
67
See EVERHART, supra note __ at 10-30; RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE
NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY 28-46 (1997).
68
“Throughout the first thirty years of its official existence . . . the Park Service enjoyed one period of
impressive growth. This was during FDR’s New Deal. With two park lovers at the helm [Roosevelt and
Ickes] . . . [a]gency officials were instructed to expand the park system wherever they could, but especially
in the eastern third of the nation where most Americans still resided.” CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note __
at 72. With the foundation o3f the National Parks Conservation Association (1920), see
http://www.npca.org/about_npca/ , and as the NPS grew more important to more people, the political
salience of the NPS and Park Service grew significantly. Common accessibility led to an emphasis within
the Park Service on further boosting visitation, an organizational focus that would eventually define the
Park Service in the twentieth century. CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note __ at 73-91; Keiter, Preserving
Nature in the National Parks, supra note __ at 654 (“[T]he Park Service has frequently subordinated its
statutory preservationist obligation to its public use obligation. Early management of the national parks
was primarily designed to encourage visitation to these remote areas.”). From there, it was a fairly straight
path to the legal challenges brought against Park Service management policies by various user groups. See,
e.g., Fund For Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F. Supp. 96 (D.D.C. 1995); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 913 F. Supp. 1334
(D. Minn. 1996); National Parks Conservation Assn. v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra
notes __ and accompanying text.
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separating lands by type.69 Utilitarian use and the setting apart of sublime nature became
two very different standards of care for public land, even while their practitioners
employed common means.
Of course, experts with delegated power from politicians can—and did—make
big mistakes. It was through the discretion granted them that both the Forest Service and
Park Service initiated what has become two of the public lands’ most bitter legacies: fire
and predator suppression.70 No legislation mandated these agency reactions to such
important elements of the ecology of North American landscapes.71 Their judgments
pleased their states and stakeholders, but they would have devastating longer-term
consequences.72 Indeed, broad-scale fire suppression,73 which amassed fuels in forests to
69

See HAYS, supra note __ at 267 (“[Roosevelt’s] administration and his social and political views are
significant primarily for their attempt to supplant [social struggle] with a “scientific” approach to social and
economic questions.”); see Klein, supra note __ at 1384-1402. Bounding the types of land to be
“reserve[d] and set aside” was a singularly “Progressive” technique for ending conflicts among parts of the
public with diverse priorities. See HAYS, supra note __ at 271-74.
70
KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 136-37. “There have been many controversies
over resource management in the Greater Yellowstone Area, but few have evoked so much emotional
debate as the question of what role fire should play.” Dennis H. Knight, The Yellowstone Fire Controversy,
in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note __ at 87. On the misuse of fire catastrophes in the
current political debate over national forest management, and their misuse in particular in the passage of the
Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003,Pub. L. No. 108-148, 117 Stat. 1887 (2003), see JACQUELINE
VAUGHN & HANNA J. CORTNER, GEORGE W. BUSH’S HEALTHY FORESTS: REFRAMING THE
ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE (2005).
71
While the 1897 “Organic Act” included an affirmation of the agency’s power to act against “destructive”
fire, it was not that legislation but rather social, market and professional forces that pushed the Forest
Service to suppress fire. See WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 447-54; KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE,
supra note __ at 141 (“Curiously, although fire plays a major role on the western landscape, few federal
laws directly address fire management on public lands.”). One of Pinchot’s more esteemed successors as
Chief Forester, William Greeley, regarded the passage of the 1924 Clarke-McNary Act—a statute
authorizing and funding federal-state cooperative action for fire suppression—as his “greatest personal
monument.” WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 454. Protecting forest reserves from negligent ignitions of fire or
unchecked deer herds, in fact, became an early source of elasticity in the Property Clause’s interpretation.
See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. United States, 139 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1944); Chalk v. United
States, 114 F.2d 207 (4th Cir. 1940). And while a series of laws authorized predator control programs, it
was the agencies themselves that transformed these authorizations into all out extermination campaigns.
See Coggins & Evans, supra note __; ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY, supra note __.
72
Though fire control had been a concern within the Forest Service from the beginning, it was not until the
late 1920s and 1930s that forest fires were viewed as a failure of management (due in part to the growing
emphasis on timber) and the policy of absolute suppression was adopted. CLARY, supra note __ at 94-126.
In 1928, the Park Service established a comprehensive program to prevent and contain fires, appointing its
first “Fire Control Expert” within its Bureau of Forestry. DILSAVER, supra note __ at 54. Predator control
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unprecedented levels, is at least one cause of the fire risks of today.74 Seeing trees as a
crop can lead the forester to view fire as a threat,75 the same way seeing game animals as
a crop led so many “conservationists” to view predators as something to be eradicated.76
The intense public pressure that mounted on these professionals to change their views
constitutes an important turning point in public lands.77

C. Expertise and Mistake: The Rise and Rejection of Experimentalism on Public Lands

by both agencies was intensive, as well. See George Cameron Coggins & Parthenia Blessing Evans,
Predators’ Rights and American Wildlife Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 821, 826-40 (1982) (describing a “war” on
predators from 1607-1960). Indeed, on the original use of “cooperative federalism” by federal natural
resources agencies (for predator extermination), see ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY, supra note __.
By the 1960s, though, the elk herd in Yellowstone had grown so large that it was being likened to pests.
See Advisor Board of Wildlife Management, Wildlife Management in the National Parks (A.S. Leopold et
al., March 4, 1963), in DILSAVER, supra note __ at 237, 243 (hereinafter “Leopold Report”).
73
There is no overestimating the national significance of the Forest Service’s single-minded conviction to
suppress fire throughout the national forests starting in the early 1910s. “Success” in fire suppression
became “[t]he No 1 job of American foresters” and a “yardstick of progress in American Forestry,”
whether practiced by federal, state, or private actors. WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 452.
74
KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note _ at 140-42 (noting that some ecosystems adapted to
high-frequency/low-intensity fires have been severely disturbed by fire suppression policy). Large-scale
disruptions of precipitation patterns may be another cause. See Lisa Crozier, Challenges to Predicting
Indirect Effects of Climate Change, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, supra note __ at 360 (Case
Study 10.1). “The 2000 and 2002 fire seasons raised public concern about the magnitude of the fire
problem, deteriorating forests, and the need for fuels reduction to restore forests and protect [wildland]
communities.” “The 122,827 fires of the 2000 fire season burned 8.43 million acres—the worst fires in the
last fifty years, eclipsing earlier records.” VAUGHN & CORTNER, supra note __ at 124. This is not to say
that the public political debate about present fire risks portrays them in an accurate light. See id.; infra
notes __ and accompanying text.
75
FEDKIW, supra note __ at 16-17; THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 73-85; CLARY, supra note __ at
73-93. On the Park Service’s felt duty to provide for pleasurable experiences free from the affronts of fire
within parks, see Keiter, Protecting Nature in the National Parks, supra note __ at 655.
76
ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY, supra note __ at 98 (detailing the support from the Boone and
Crocket Club for wolf extermination efforts). On the transformation of what began as a policy of predator
“control” into a fully bureaucratized mission of extermination, eventually expanding to species “released”
by the elimination of their natural checks, see id. at 178-304. No fewer than a dozen species of predators
that were hunted, trapped, shot, poisoned or otherwise pursued by the various bureaus of the Departments
of Interior and Agriculture would eventually be listed or become candidates for listing under the ESA. Id.
77
Forest Service and Park Service documents began acknowledging the many dimensions in which fire was
an important element of North American forest ecology only many years after the decisions to suppress fire
on a system-wide basis had been made. See Fire Management Policy Review Team, Report on Fire
Management Policy (U.S. Dept. of Agriculture & U.S. Dept. of Interior 1988). Likewise, the policies of
predator suppression came under intense public scrutiny by the 1960s and 1970s. See STANLEY CAIN, ET
AL., PREDATOR CONTROL—1971, REPORT TO THE CEQ AND THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BY THE
ADVISORY COMM. ON PREDATOR CONTROL (1972) (hereinafter “CAIN REPORT”).
18

Pinchot’s vision of “reserves” administered by a professional corps of trained
specialists, of course, became the wider paradigm for public land management, whatever
the precise priorities of the system created.78 And Pinchot was just one among waves of
Progressives who pushed for a wider reformation of mass democracy in the mold of what
David Held has called the “technocratic vision.”79 The Progressive model of
experimentation in the approach to public problems is coming back in earnest,80 although
the public shows little interest in a theory of expertise that presumes mistakes.
Notably, it was only years after the predator and fire elimination policies were
known to be mistakes that ecologists working with (but outside of) the Park Service

78

See WILKINSON, supra note __ at 120-35; CLARKE & MCCOOL, supra note __ at 49-66; KEITER, KEEPING
FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 20-21. Pinchot’s vision was not uncontroversial, to be sure. Indeed,
in its execution, major milestones were set in the emergence of the administrative state. Between 1905 and
1907, Pinchot and his friend President Roosevelt relocated the governance of the forest reserves out of what
they perceived to be a bureaucracy overrun by patronage politics (the Department of Interior’s General
Land Office) and into one they perceived to be less so (the Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of
Forestry). THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 36-42; HAYS, supra note __ at 35-48. Opinions vary on
the effectiveness of that move. See HAYS, supra note __ at 165-74; Huffman, supra note __ at 262-72.
Furthermore, Pinchot was eventually fired over a conflict with a later Secretary of Interior, Ballinger, in
what became a famous incident in the political supervision of administrative agencies. See CARPENTER,
supra note __ at 275-89.
In 1911, Pinchot and his allies provoked heated congressional debates over the federal
government’s constitutional authority to acquire eastern lands from willing sellers for purposes of
conservation. Out of those debates came the Weeks Act, the statute that would eventually bring the few
National Forests and several small National Parks there are to the East and Northeast. See GATES, supra
note __ at 593-97. By 1961, nearly 20 million acres had been acquired under this authority. THE
GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 79. Finally, also in 1911, in United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911), the Supreme Court held for the first time that administrative agencies like the Forest Service
could—with the proper delegation of authority from Congress—write rules and regulations having the
force of law. This, of course, initiated a central dimension of the administrative state.
79
See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 157-98 (2d ed. 1996); PURCELL, supra note __.
In 1917 Richard Ely, a professor of political economy at the University of Wisconsin, defined
conservation as the division of economics that deals with production. But he did not have then,
nor did Gifford Pinchot, a full scientific understanding of how the natural economy in fact works,
or any measurements of its productive efficiencies, or in general any mathematical tools for
dealing with that system. Without such scientific guidance, neither the economist nor the
bureaucrat could go very far toward managing the land for higher production.
WORSTER, supra note __ at 312. This was, in short, a conceptual and analytic step, not a managerial one.
80
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK:
RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH (2003); Brandon L. Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist
Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 261 (2004); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004).
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acknowledged publicly how truly destructive the experiments had become.81 Experts in
and out of government came to a sobering conclusion from early 1960s’ work on this
mismanagement of public lands: any rational land use policy required a far better
understanding of ecology than might be achieved practically.82 So, while utilitarian
“conservation” for sustained yields was supposed to protect the long-term productivity of
the land (whether out of the fear of famine or the promise of prosperity),83 it could not
admit its own fallibility.84
The need for an explicitly experimentalist, adaptive approach to public lands
policy was evident by the 1960s, though. Putting it into effect was something else. For
the agencies also learned that their managerial choices could not be kept indefinitely
provisional, that they could not just welcome nature’s unpredictability—whether it was
more rational and “public-regarding” or not.85 Unpredictability and on-the-ground field
office control precluded too much of the private ordering that has defined our public
81

See Leopold Report, supra note __ at 245-46; CAIN REPORT, supra note __. In fact, the Park Service had
announced its first policy reversal on predator suppression as early as 1931, stating that it would no longer
conduct a “widespread campaign” against predators like wolves, pumas, bears, and others (although it
continued suppression policies where it found predators threatening to “more useful species”). SELLARS,
supra note __ at 119. Sellars, the Park Service’s official historian, emphasized how important separation
from the internal bureaucratic structure was to the independence of the seminal reports ultimately done by
the National Academy of Sciences and the Leopold Committee in the 1960s. They documented the
agency’s ecological failings. See id. at 214-21. See also KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra
note __ at 137-38 (“Spurred by the seminal 1963 Leopold Report, the Park Service adopted new resource
management policies allowing naturally caused fires to burn when they would promote vegetation or
wildlife management objectives.”).
82
Compare SELLARS, supra note __ at 214 (“Ecological management [within the Park Service of the 1960s]
inherently required far deeper understanding of natural resources than did scenic preservation and tourism
management. . . .”) with CLARY, supra note __ at 178 (“Almost overnight the public became imbued with a
sense of the complexity of the national environment, while scientists gained an increasing voice in public
affairs. . . . Competing specialists began to question one another, and the public at large made its own
opinions known.”).
83
THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note ___ at 228-31; Pisani, supra note __.
84
See A University View of the Forest Service, S. Doc. No. 115, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-17 (1970)
(hereinafter the “Bolle Report”). Whether the mistakes were about means or ends is left aside here. See,
e.g., WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 371 (“The upswelling [sic] of the mid-1970s . . . was not a
response to a lack of quality within the Forest Service; it was a reaction to timber domination.”).
85
See EVERHART, supra note __ 95-105, 110-16 (Park Service); WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at
76-90 (Forest Service); FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 56-61 (FWS).
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lands systems.86 Allowing fire and predation to run their course has met extreme
opposition—putting the land managers under another kind of intense pressure for over a
generation now.87 It is one thing to manage land without suppressing fire or predators out
of a belief in their ecological functionality. It is something else again to do so as a
federal administrative agency.88 Its spillovers and mistakes have a legal and political
valence unknown to other landowners and this foundational reality of public lands has
always compromised the technocratic vision.89 Whatever the priorities, public lands
stewards have always been under such disadvantages.
86

CULHANE, supra note __ at 204-05, 333-34; Blumm, supra note __ at 420-21; Raymond & Fairfax, supra
note __ at 727-45. “Local politicians viewed the summer fire season [in Yellowstone, 1988] as a disaster,
not a watershed ecological event. For them, the fires had devastated the park’s once beautiful native
forests, unnecessarily endangered neighboring communities, disrupted summer tourism businesses, and
thus represented a flawed policy experiment.” KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at
139; Keiter, supra note __ at 669 (“Believing that wolves and natural fire threaten paramount human safety
and property concerns, park neighbors have applied intense political and legal pressure to stop or modify
specific restoration efforts.”). Indeed, even after being chastened by the Leopold and NAS reports, see
supra note __, the Park Service’s internal bureaucratic power structure (itself a function of different
external pressures) inhibited the earlier emergence of a science-based approach to park (and especially fire)
management. See SELLARS, supra note __ at 221-46; see also ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY,
supra note __ (tracing the history of politics trumping science within FWS, its precursors, and other
bureaus charged with predator control). On the wider role reliance interests broadly defined have played in
federal environmental and natural resources law, see generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk
Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025 (1983); Jeffrey S. Kopf, Steamrolling Section 7(d) of the Endangered
Species Act: How Sunk Costs Undermine Environmental Regulation, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 393
(1996).
87
Records of Park Service biologists arguing in the 1930s that predator suppression ought to be ended
within the NPS show that their counsel met harsh resistance from above. See SELLARS, supra note __ at
119-23. Reliance interests and sunk costs were then and have ever since been powerful countervailing
forces against “expertise.” Today, it is probably no exaggeration to say that the “wildland-urban interface,”
a euphemism of the growing number of homes being built right up to the edges of (or even on inholdings
within) publicly owned timberlands, is today the single most important driver of Forest Service fire policy.
See VAUGHN & CORTNER, supra note __ 202-03.
88
The Predator and Rodent Control (“PARC”) Branch of the Biological Survey was legislated into
existence in 1915. Stanley A. Cain, Predator and Pest Control, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 379, 380
(Howard P. Brokaw ed., 1978); see also CAIN REPORT, supra note __. PARC became one of the
Departments of Agriculture and Interior’s most resilient bureaus, eventually being reshuffled and renamed
the Animal Damage Control program, see Coggins & Evans, supra note __ at 835-63 (describing the
efficacy and political life of ADC), and into what it is known euphemistically as today: “Wildlife
Services.” See, e.g., Associated Press Newswire, January 29, 2006, Federal Hunt Nets 200 Coyotes:
Arizona Ranchers Complained Animals Were Eating Calves.
89
That the public lands policies of predator eradication and fire suppression were expert mistakes is not
usually debated any longer. On the other hand, the nature of these mistakes and who has borne the harms
they created is still the subject of intense debate. Compare WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 487 (“Throughout
the country, 60 years of fire suppression had caused a marked deterioration in the composition of the
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This is clearest today in our collective inability to replace the
preservation/conservation dichotomy with anything more descriptively accurate and/or
democratically constructive for public lands law.90 Notwithstanding all our advances, we
appear unable to incorporate nature’s inherent stochasticity or the turn toward ecological
restoration into the public lexicon of public lands.91 Why? The politics either could
provoke might focus needed attention on identifying our many management mistakes and
promoting experimentation with their corrections. Ecological restoration of fire or
predators would be “noncreative with respect to objectives, neither improving on nature
nor improvising on it but attempting, blankly, to copy it.”92 It is necessarily dynamic,
too, given all of the unknowns involved. But restoration is, at bottom, about recovering a
biome’s elements regardless of their utility to humanity.93 And that would be a rather

nation’s forests.”) with John D. Varley & Paul Schullery, Reality and Opportunity in the Yellowstone Fires
of 1988, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note __ at 105, 117 (“Probably no topic
generated more urgent public concern than the welfare of park wildlife [during the 1988 Yellowstone fires]
. . . . But few observers were prepared for what we witnessed when Yellowstone wildlife encountered the
fires. Wildlife losses were remarkably light.”); see also Coggins & Evans, supra note __ at 824 (“Many
people now recognize that the effects of predation do not always hurt human pocketbooks and that some
“predatory” activities result in economic benefit, directly and indirectly.”); Holly Doremus, Restoring
Endangered Species: The Importance of Being Wild, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 32-38 (1999) (reviewing
the commonly attributed costs of different wildlife restoration initiatives).
90
Right beside the Leopold Report’s call for the hiding of “observable artificiality in any form” within
parks and preserves, DILSAVER, supra note __ at 242, the committee also argued that parks “should
represent a vignette of primitive America,” id. at 239, that is, that the Park Service should adopt a
restorative agenda. To do so, “it follows logically that every phase of management itself be under the full
jurisdiction of biologically trained personnel of the Park Service.” Id. at 243; see also SELLARS, supra note
__ at 215 (describing the impact of the Leopold Report as an “extraordinary challenge[] to a bureau long
focused on accommodating tourism.”). Restoration had little traction in national politics then, and it seems
(analysts like Keiter notwithstanding) to have little traction today.
91
See JORDAN, supra note __ at 28-53. Conservation biologists confronting the centuries of human-caused
disturbances of North American biomes readily embrace the vocabulary of “restoration” over that of
conservation or preservation, especially with respect to species that must be actively managed for recovery.
See, e.g., Daniel Simberloff et al., Regional and Continental Restoration, in CONTINENTAL
CONSERVATION: SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS OF REGIONAL RESERVE NETWORKS 65, 65-68 (Michael E. Soulé
& John Terborgh eds., 1999) (hereinafter “CONTINENTAL CONSERVATION”); see infra notes __ and
accompanying text.
92
JORDAN, supra note __ at 24 (emphasis in original).
93
Simberloff et al., supra note __. This challenge is perhaps even greater than the scientific challenges
inherent in restoration. “Above all, the social, economic, and political climate must be suitable. If there is
not broad support for a restoration project, it is unlikely to succeed.” Id. at 71. Restoration does, however,
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magnanimous approach to public lands from its stewards and stakeholders (and, for that
reason, perhaps one not to be expected).94
More importantly, though, “[l]and, like other aspects of culture, exhibits a
frequently arbitrary diversity from place to place, in the manner in which it might be
treated, in rights of use, in types of tenure, and in laws governing these customs. Indeed
the meanings of their property to two owners may be so disparate that a single line
separates values as incommensurate as the proverbial apples and oranges, even if the
parcels are identical in physical quality.”95 Public lands are no exception. “Land appears
to have been viewed as a marketable commodity from its first distribution in the
colonies.”96 And as the different preservation and conservation constituencies identified
more and more with ‘their’ lands throughout the Twentieth century, it was the
distinctions and boundaries themselves that reified.97 Ecological restoration would

have the pragmatic advantage over other approaches in the identification of desirable ecological conditions.
Cf. JORDAN, supra note __ at 195 (“Restoration . . . provides a way around [the impasse created by trying to
rank order parts of nature to be protected] because it offers, as other environmental paradigms do not, a
context for confronting and dealing productively with the shame of our encounter with nature as other. . .
.”).
94
Compare Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government
Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 567-68 (2002) (“The rational administrator will act to maintain his
position and to expand the authority of his agency.”) with CARPENTER, supra note __ at 354 (arguing that
bureaucratic autonomy, when it is achieved, is based “not upon the popularity of a policy, not upon
occasional administrative fiat, not upon a single well-heeled lobby, but upon the stable political legitimacy
of the bureaucracy itself”); see generally MASHAW, supra note__ (proposing a paradigm of administrative
law that seeks to control for the self-interested opportunism of all actors with law-making power, including
expert agencies). Too often today, the very thing that makes some discrete segment of the “public”
effective in our national political arena is also what separates it and its interests from that public. Id. at 19.
95
EDWARD T. PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND: EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS OF OUR PRIVATE PROPERTY
MOSAIC 5 (1995). “Land as property reveals nature and culture inextricably entangled. A parcel of land has
an indubitably physical existence, biological too with its vegetation and soils.” Id.; cf. Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (characterizing landowners’ changed rights bordering the publicly
owned submerged lands as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property—the right to exclude others.”).
96
PRICE, DIVIDING THE LAND, supra note __at 332.
97
See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 317-18 (finding that “ecological realities”
are forcing experts to question “the role of boundaries” separating kinds of land, both public and private);
see also Douglas A. Kysar & James Salzman, Environmental Tribalism, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1099 (2003).
The progress of ecological sciences might have promoted greater cooperation and integration instead of
greater polarization, certainly. See infra notes __ and accompanying text. But our federal system itself
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require exactly the kind of pluralistic deliberation and collaboration by the users, abutters,
affinity groups, and administrators of the different types of (public) lands that all those
parties evolved to avoid.98 For this reason alone restoration might never provide very
much of the political vocabulary of nature protection in the administrative state.99
Put more generally, if somewhat dismally, the conceptual structure of land in our
desiccated “public sphere” has curbed the prospects for conservation by federal public
lands law.100 Nevertheless, biodiversity decline continues, meaning that Progressivism’s
fractious public philosophy of land management has set this whole field of law into its
own warped endgame. For, even while “conservationists continued to push for statelevel programs to manage wildlife” and “preservationists began to push for federal
programs to protect wildlife,”101 public lands law was trapped within its own history—
putting out of reach the very means necessary to its ends.

bears some of the responsibility for the lost opportunity. “[T]he combination of uncertainty and complexity
creates an atmosphere conducive to group polarization—the tendency for individuals to become more
extreme in their views by virtue of their membership in a group.” Id. at 1120. See infra notes __ and
accompanying text.
98
Raymond & Fairfax, supra note __ at 727-45 (describing the Progressive agenda as structurally
committed to fragmentation); ROBERT J. BRULLE, AGENCY, DEMOCRACY, AND NATURE: THE U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT FROM A CRITICAL THEORY PERSPECTIVE 269-82 (2000). “The serious
divisions that exist within the environmental movement require a restructuring of the political and
ideological cleavages that exist within and among the various environmentalisms so that a coherent project
of collective action can be developed.” Id. at 276.
99
See Colburn, Localism’s Ecology, supra note __ at ___; BRULLE, supra note __ (tracing five distinct
discourses in modern environmentalism and their core attributes making them incommensurable with one
another); Robert J Brulle, Habermas and Green Political Thought: Two Roads Converging, 11 ENVTL.
POL. 1, 13-14 (2002) (hereinafter Brulle, “Two Roads Converging”).
100
Cf. Brulle, Two Roads Converging, supra note __ at 2-3 (arguing that defects in our basic social
institutions are preventing a more constructive use of politics and political dialogue that would promote
better, more collectively rational environmental policies). I refer to the “public sphere” in roughly the
sense used by Habermas, as a field of discourse collectivizing an indefinite audience for purposes of selfgovernment and in which the procedural norms of engagement are vitally important to the ultimate success
of that endeavor. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 175-86, 360-61 (William Rehg trans. 1998). But Habermas’s
procedural account of democratic legitimacy is at least compatible, at least in the abstract, with Rawls’s
more substantive account. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED
PAPERS 573, 582-83 & n.28 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
101
YAFFEE, supra note __ at 37 (emphasis in original).
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III. PRESERVATIONISM AND PROCEDURE: PUBLIC LANDS LAW “REFORM,” 1964-76
By 1960, Congress was beginning to voice the public’s dissatisfaction with the
agencies’ corporatist approach to conservation. The Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960 (“MUSYA”) shows the unease.102 Still, like the Progressive and New Deal statutes
and agency policies, it presumed that a “greatest good for the greatest number” could be
extracted from parcels of land by trusting in the right forms of expertise and
organization.103 But it foreshadowed what was coming.104

102

Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960). MUSYA issued no determinate directive to the Forest Service
and MUSYA did nothing to blunt the agency’s emphasis on merchantable commodities extractable from
the land. “Multiple use” was defined in the Act to mean “management of all the various renewable surface
resources of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the needs of
the American people; making the most judicious use of the land for some or all of these resources or related
services over areas large enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to conform to
changing needs and conditions . . . and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output.” Id. at § 4(a), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 531(a). It does not, however,
say whether multiple use should be achieved unit-by-unit or what remedies there are if the agencies fail to
achieve it.
103
One federal court famously described the statute as “breath[ing] discretion at every pore.” Perkins v.
Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 807 (9th Cir. 1979); WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 60-66.
Essentially, MUSYA was a declaration that “the national forests are establish and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes.” The uses were listed
alphabetically so as to avoid even a hint of priority of one over the other and were, in fact, ushered through
Congress by the Forest Service itself in order to solidify the agency’s legal authority in the face of rising
conflict among timber and preservation interests. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 29-31.
Moreover, the Act required only that the Forest Service give equal “consideration” to all of the uses—not
that it actually provide for each equally or that there be any remedy against the agency if it failed to do so.
See Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1979).
104
As noted public land law scholar Charles Wilkinson argued forcefully, the multiple use agencies (chiefly
BLM and the Forest Service) had been, over a long history of receiving blank check delegations, failures—
even if their only objective was to deliver the greatest quantifiable good to the greatest number presently
accounted for. This is at least partly because irrigators, ranchers, miners, timber companies, and others
with concentrated stakes played such dominant roles in these agencies’ decision-making. See CHARLES F.
WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992).
Indeed, the government has heavily subsidized many such private uses in order to make them seem
profitable. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why Multiple Use Failed,
18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 408-15 (1994). “It is clear that the concepts of multiple use and sustained
yield have failed to produce sustainable public land ecosystems supporting a variety of renewable
resources. This failure is demonstrated by the enormous costs of the subsidy system as well as by that
system's deleterious effects on wildlife . . . .” Id. at 429. What is much less clear is whether uses other than
commodity extraction (like those prioritized by the Wilderness Act) would necessarily be more “public
regarding” or would just be the switching of priorities to recreation and related interests. See infra notes __
and accompanying text.
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The Forest Service’s practices at the time were attracting potent criticism,
especially from adherents of utilitarian conservationism.105 Congress was pushed to be
more specific about how conservation lands should be managed.106 The most
consistently efficient forestry technique—clearcutting and the conversion of slowgrowing to fast-growing age structures and species—had become quite alarming in
appearance.107 Indeed, it is probably fair to say that the Forest Service itself provoked
one of Congress’s most pointed erasures of agency discretion in American history. While
faith in expertise may have waxed or waned,108 the fear that agencies like the Forest
Service had become the captives of the industries with which they dealt had gripped

105

It is important to note, though, what MUSYA (like the Wilderness Act and others after it) took care not
to change: the modus vivendi that had emerged between the federal land managers and state fish and game
departments regarding jurisdiction over resident wildlife. While Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948),
Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948), and United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19
(1947), effectively demolished the state ownership doctrines with respect to wildlife and other natural
resources, the agencies had made no efforts whatever to exclude state wildlife authorities on federal lands.
The statutes in question in this part, by and large, sought to preserve the stand-off. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §
1133(d)(7). MUSYA and others make clear that no part was to be construed as “affecting the jurisdiction
or responsibilities of the several States with respect to wildlife and fish in the national forests.” Pub. L. No.
86-517, § 1, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 528.
106
Opinion is still divided over the reasons for the significant rise in clearcutting on Forest Service lands
through the 1950s and ’60s. The Forest Service has long argued that public demand for lumber in the postwar housing boom drove the practice. See THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note __ at 137-42. But its own
historians have suggested otherwise. See, e.g., CLARY, supra note __ at 180-88. By 1969, the first
systematically critical study of Forest Service policies conducted by professional foresters outside the
agency was set to chastise it for its forestry practices. See Bolle Report, supra note __.
107
Technological improvements and economic shifts brought clearcutting to places that had not previously
experienced it and widened perceptions of Forest Service malfeasance. THE GREATEST GOOD, supra note
__ at 147-51; CLARY, supra note __ 183-88. Sierra Club leader David Brower and others may have burned
with outrage in the 1960s lead-up to the Monongahela and Tongass cases, see West Virginia Div. of Izaak
Walton League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975); Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258
(D. Alaska 1975)—precedents that “effectively stopped clearcutting in the national forests.” JAMES
RASBAND ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1187 (2004). But FDR himself had recoiled in
horror at the sight of clearcutting in his tour of Olympic National Forest in 1936. CLARY, supra note __ at
103.
108
Cf. Blumm, supra note __ at 418 (describing a “widespread perception that administrative agencies were
stagnant bureaucracies incapable of pursuing the public interest” in the mid-1960s) (citing Bruce Ackerman
& William Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466, 1474-79 (1980);
Stewart, supra note __ at 1676-81); but cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN
COAL/DIRTY AIR 94-103 (1981) (arguing that the “high-tide of technocratic rationality” on Capitol Hill was
not reached until the late 1970s).
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Washington.109 When the flood of legislation leveled, the use of public lands had become
one of the most prescriptive fields in the administrative state: more legal boundaries were
inscribed separating more kinds of nature according to finer distinctions of use-priorities
and jurisdictional turf than ever before. ROADMAP

A. Communing with (Wild) Nature: Wilderness Preservation in the Public Sphere
Preservationism’s renaissance began with the Wilderness Act of 1964. The Act
created a new “overlay zoning” system: the National Wilderness Preservation System
(“NWPS”).110 Under the Act, public lands, including multiple use lands, were to be
expertly surveyed and, for the areas “pristine” enough,111 given a permanently protective
109

The signature academic accounts of such agency infidelities are MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATION OF
BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (1955), and GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM:
A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1900-1916 (1963). Their veracity is subject to many
reasonable doubts. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaning of the
Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 309 (2002).
Nonetheless, by the middle of the 1960s, decisions of the D.C. Circuit—especially those of Judges
Bazelon, Leventhal, and Wright—seemed increasingly alert to such possibilities. See Thomas Merrill,
Capture Theory and the Courts, 1967-1976, 72 CH.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997).
110
Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1134. I mark 1964 somewhat
arbitrarily. In 1948, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (“IUCN”) was formed in
Morges, Switzerland, initiating what has evolved into the modern era of biodiversity conservation. See
STEPHEN L. YAFFEE, PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 35-36
(1982). In tandem with IUCN, the Department of Interior began researching endangered species in the
1940s and 50s. Id. at 190 n.12. But it was not until 1964, the same year the Interior Department’s
Wilderness Act passed, that the “Committee on Rare and Endangered Wildlife Species” was first
established within the Department of Interior. Id. at 34-35. Its nine biologists were tasked with creating
the “first official federal list of rare and endangered species of species of fish and wildlife.” Id. at 35. Of
course, “[a]ttempts at explicitly balancing other considerations (such as utility or disutility to humans) were
not seen as necessary [jus then] because listing a species . . . did not provide formal federal protection and
hence would not economically harm anyone.” Id.
The most famous polemic on the significance of the Wilderness Act and the political forces that
finally coalesced to produce it is Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and
Meaning, 45 OR. L. REV. 288 (1966). A decade later, after the first generation of wilderness designation
processes—which certainly did have economic implications for particular interests—Professor Robinson
wrote what appears to be the first critical assessment of the statute and in particular the Forest Service’s
administration. See Glen O. Robinson, Wilderness: The Last Frontier, 59 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1974).
111
The Wilderness Act’s concept of “wilderness” in modern society is quite illustrative of the tension
between “conservation” and “preservation” in public lands law. “A wilderness, in contrast with those areas
where man and his own works dominate the landscape,” should be preserved “[i]n order to assure that an
increasing population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing mechanization, does not occupy
and modify all areas within the United States and its possessions, leaving no lands designated for
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zoning designation.112 The test divided nature and humanity sharply. “Wilderness” was
defined as land “where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man,
where man himself is a visitor who does not remain” with “primeval character and
influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation”—and at least five
thousand acres or of sufficient size to “make practicable its preservation and use in an
unimpaired condition.”113 And the link between this form of preservation and capture
theory was evident: who created such impacts besides those motivated by commodity and
profit?114
The Forest Service had zoned “primitive areas” within its reserves long before the
Wilderness Act or MUSYA’s inclusion of “outdoor recreation” and “wildlife” as coequal
land use priorities.115 The legislative outpouring begun in 1964 was all aimed at agency

preservation and protection in their natural condition . . . .” 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131(c), 1131(a). This notion of
“wilderness,” essentially aesthetic in concept, places the selected parcel of forest opposite those lands
where multiple use is practiced and produces a cultivated environment. See Marion Clawson, The Concept
of Multiple Use Forestry, 8 ENVTL. L. 281, 304 (1978). But it also prohibits the use of mechanized
equipment in designated areas—perhaps even the use of such equipment for needed preservation or
restoration measures. See Robinson, supra note __ at 50-56. Indeed, the strict dichotomization of this
semantic, constructed notion of “wilderness” from the lands people are meant to inhabit and make their
own has induced many to question its conceptual integrity. See William Cronon, The Trouble with
Wilderness, Or Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING
NATURE 69 (William Cronon ed., 1995) (hereinafter “UNCOMMON GROUND”); Stephen M. Meyer, End of
the Wild, 29 BOSTON REV. 20 (2004).
112
The inaugural pieces of the NWPS portfolio came from various administratively designated “primitive”
areas the Forest Service had begun setting aside in the 1920s. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __
at 334-41. This was the beginning of the convergence of “roadless” and “wilderness” qualities. See Klein,
supra note __ at 1374-76.
113
Pub. L. No. 88-577, § 2, 78 Stat. 890, codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c). Together with the statute
structuring future additions to the NWPS, the Act designated some 9 million acres into the system from
among the lands the Forest Service had inventoried as “primitive.” NASH, supra note __ at 222-27.
114
Today, it is widely known that motorized recreationists do so—ostensibly without any intention of
extracting anything tangible from the land. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 301 F.3d
1217, 1228 n.7 (19th Cir. 2002) (“For example, the [BLM] specifically notes that “[c]ross-country vehicle
use off boundary roads and existing ways” constitutes surface disturbance . . . because “the tracks created
by the vehicles leave depressions or ruts, compact the soils, and trample or compress vegetation.””), rev’d,
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004).
115
Beginning in 1929, the Forest Service’s so-called L-20 regulations set general guidelines for the
establishment and management of roadless areas. By 1933 its foresters had inventoried almost 55 million
acres of such lands. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 338. Sixty-three such areas totaling
8.4 million acres of this inventory initiated the primitive area system and it was this system of lands that the
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discretion in the matter. It invested strict rules and procedures with their own legal force,
controlling agency discretion and, to a degree, bringing preservation of the “wild” to
conservation lands by law.116 It was to be the reformation of bureaucratic deliberation—
to be presumptively open to public scrutiny—through statutorily specified process.117
The NWPS has grown spectacularly since, due in large part to a rich history of
issue advocacy and agency-forcing litigation.118 Today, it is touted to citizencontributors as 106 million acres of lands dispersed across the country (or at least west of

Forest Service maintained for purposes of wilderness recreation in the following three decades. While
championed by preservation luminaries like Bob Marshall, the Forest Service’s “primitive” designations
and their attendant management plans rarely prohibited extractive industry completely—even while the
official inventory swelled throughout the 1940s, ’50, and early ’60s. Id. at 340-44.
116
Of course it was not (and could not have been) complete displacement of such judgment. Even as to the
most controversial Forest Service policy—stand replacement by clearcutting—the Congress hedged with
amply manipulable language in NFMA. The “diversity of plant and animal communities” requirement was
qualified by the primacy of “overall multiple-use objectives,” even as to the seemingly unexceptionable
goal of “preserv[ing] the diversity of tree species similar to that existing in the region controlled by the
plan.” Cf. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (requiring such preservation “where appropriate, to the degree
practicable”).
117
In that, the legislation was assured a chilled reception from its principal addressee—a bureaucracy
accustomed to having the final say on the balancing of competing values in its “expert” administration of
the public lands. Robinson, supra note __ at 16-25 (describing Forest Service resistance to wilderness
designations). Indeed, by 1975 Congress again seized the initiative by designating fifteen wilderness areas
in the East and directing the Forest Service to pay closer attention to seventeen other “wilderness study
areas” east of the 100th meridian. See Pub. L. No. 93-622, 88 Stat. 2096 (1975) (“The Eastern Wilderness
Act of 1975”). “Wilderness Study Areas” are lands protected from logging and other forms of
extractive/consumptive use unless and until Congress itself chooses to “release” them from such status.
STATS. & CITE
118
See generally BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note __ at 316-29. That growth has mostly been in acreage. Cf.
Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985) (denying that agencies have enforceable duties to
secure necessary water supplies to preserve wilderness area characteristics even where water rights are
present); Forest Guardians v. Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 309 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that the Wilderness Act does not prohibit the continuation of predator suppression policies within
the NWPS); The Wilderness Society v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (dismissing 44 count
complaint against National Park Service for failing to conduct wilderness assessments, to prepare
wilderness management plans, to forward wilderness recommendations to the President, and “otherwise to
take required measures to protect wilderness resources in this country” on grounds plaintiffs lacked Article
III standing and/or pleaded claims on which relief could be granted). The Wilderness Society, Sierra Club
and scores of other affinity groups perfected the technique of using membership dues and messages of
impending doom as a mode of raising capital with which to wage their campaigns—most of which
explicitly or implicitly invoked the Progressive preservationist ideals enshrined in the Wilderness Act. See
BRULLE, supra note __ at 168-72. The other principal cause of this spectacular growth of the NWPS was
the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 94 Stat. 2371 (1980), doubling the NWPS
through its addition of 56 million acres in ten different units. See
http://www.wilderness.net/index.cfm?fuse=NWPS&sec=fastFacts. (“Since 54% of America’s Wilderness
is found in Alaska, only 2.58% of the continental United States . . . is protected as Wilderness.”).
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the Rockies) where the wild remains. Yet this system, strewn about the other “systems”
as it is, consists in little more than its legal controls on logging, motorized vehicles, road
building, and certain other activities.119 The preservation for which this wilderness
“system” is so emblematic, that is, bears only passing relation to biodiversity and habitat
protection.120 Grazing and mining—two uses of the public lands with long histories of
habitat-destructive effects—still go on in most wilderness areas, specifically saved by the
Act121 in a compromise reached for its passage.122 In truth, the holdouts can represent a
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BLM and the Forest Service offer instructive contrasts in their approaches to NWPS lands within their
own systems. BLM, for example (often sued for permitting excessive grazing even by multiple use
standards, see, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Nev. 1985)),
recently lost a bid to, in effect, ignore a congressional wilderness designation by arguing that the area’s
wilderness character and values were not unduly compromised by roads servicing grazing operations. See
Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 F. Supp.2d 1141, 1154-55 (D. Ariz. 2004). For its part, the Forest Service has shown
a willingness to enforce tight restrictions on miners’ use of motor vehicles within wilderness areas. See,
e.g., Clouser v. Espy, 42 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1994). But it has also argued that, because no statutory
language “plainly establishes that predator control is prohibited by the Wilderness Act,” it is the agency
itself that should decide when lethal predator control methods may be employed in wilderness areas for
livestock protection. See Brief for Federal Appellees, Forest Guardians et al. v. Animal and Plant Health
Inspec. Serv., No.01-15239 at 8 (9th Cir. 2001), decided as Forest Guardians et al. v. Animal and Plant
Health Inspec. Serv., 309 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002).
120
Compare Parker, 448 F.2d at 795 (“We have no difficulty in recognizing the general purpose of the
Wilderness Act. It is simply a congressional acknowledgement of the necessity of preserving one factor of
our natural environment from the progressive, destructive and hasty inroads of man . . . .”) with
McCloskey, supra note __ at 288 (“Though natural beauty is widely appreciated, wilderness is an idealized
conception of nature in pure form that becomes generally prized only in advanced cultures.”). Some
prominent commentators have argued that wilderness designations are among the most powerful tools of
habitat protection. See, e.g., BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note __ at 315 (“Wilderness is the only legislative
land designation that protects habitat from most forms of development, including road building. . . . [T]he
Act assures that substantial areas of public land will be spared from forms of use and development most
damaging to wildlife.”). If that is true, then it is only true for Alaska and the third of the contiguous United
States west of the Rocky Mountains. Of the approximately 106 million acres in the NWPS, only __ or
about __ percent are found in the eastern two-thirds of the 48 states. Moreover, while it is true that road
building and most forms of extractive use can significantly degrade or alter habitats and that, therefore, the
Wilderness Act is at least presumptively habitat-protective, as I have argued elsewhere, this negative
conception of “preservation” obscures too much about how connectivity and overall habitat functionality so
vitally depend on affirmative action and restoration. See Colburn, Localism’s Ecology, supra note __.
121
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1133(d)(1), 1133(d)(3).
122
This story has been contested, but I regard it as the only plausible explanation for §§ 1133(d)(1) and
133(d)(3)—and one that has been confirmed repeatedly. See Luna B. Leopold, Foreword, in THE GREATER
YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM, supra note __ at ix; NASH, supra note __ at 222-26. While the management
agencies generally have worked to minimize such uses, the statute makes clear in several ways that its
intent was to respect “existing private rights” of several kinds. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(5). The Forest Service
regulations, for example, state that “[n]atural ecological succession will be allowed to operate freely”
within designated areas, “to the extent feasible.” 36 C.F.R. § 293.2(a). But they also stipulate that “[t]he
grazing of livestock, where such use was established before the date of legislation which includes an area in
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variety of risks to a biome—some trivial, some not. But efforts to prolong the mining or
grazing indefinitely are common, making them a crucible of bitter, sometimes nationally
symbolic conflict.123 So, with so much energy drawn to these kinds of fights (fueled as
much by vestigial hopes of putting “wild” nature on a pedestal as by any actual proof of
harm), a diminished commitment to collectively pursuing desirable ecological conditions
and solving common problems is the norm.124
As a public purpose, saving the authentically wild and threatened has become
rather Orwellian, due in part to passionate, very effective advocacy for preserving
ecosystems that are actually heavily disturbed and dynamic.125 First of all, much of the

the National Wilderness P reservation System, shall be permitted to continue” consistent with regulations
governing livestock in the National Forest System (and any specific controls for the particular areas). Id. at
§ 293.7(a). Even when done by best management practices, though, grazing’s routine impacts on a biome
include trampling, soil erosion and compaction, stream and bank deterioration and erosion, and habitat
competition with various species of wildlife. JERRY HOLECHEK ET AL., RANGE MANAGEMENT: PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICES 371-411 (5th ed. 2004). The totality of disturbances attributable to livestock operations—
including such things as lethal predator controls—is another matter entirely. See, e.g.,Forest Guardians v.
Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 309 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding Forest Service
determination that killing predators in Wilderness Areas in response to ranchers’ requests is permitted
under the Act); ROBINSON, PREDATORY BUREAUCRACY, supra note __ at 325-36.
123
See, e.g., Mitchel P. McClaran, Livestock in Wilderness: A Review and Forecast, 20 ENVTL L. 857
(1990). What is zoned in or out of most wilderness areas bears little relationship to conservation biology.
In a curious though probably accurate interpretation of the Wilderness Act, the Ninth Circuit recently
reversed FWS and held that the Act’s mandate excluding “commercial enterprise” from designated
wilderness areas, see 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), meant that the agency could not permit the operation of a
hatchery in a wilderness area that would introduce roughly six million hatchery-reared salmon fry into the
largest lake in the Kenai Wildlife Refuge’s wilderness area. See Wilderness Society v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
124
An example is the spread of invasive plants throughout one of the originally designated wilderness areas
of 1964, the Selway-Bitterroot in western Montana and north-central Idaho. Only very recently did the
Forest Service finally identify and respond to one of the most potent vectors of the invasion: horse feed. In
2002 it announced an (overdue) order across all four of the affected national forests—the Nez Perce,
Clearwater, Lolo, and Bitterroot—mandating all users substitute “weed seed free feed” for their animals.
See http://www.fs.fed.us/r1/clearwater/ResourceProg/Wilderness/wilderness_report . Very generally, this
kind of active management (and its attendant restoration techniques) is routinely troublesome in wilderness
areas given the very concept of “wilderness” animating the whole system. See Michael McCloskey,
Changing Views of What the Wilderness System is All About, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 369, 374-79 (1999).
125
The wild that merits our putting it on a pedestal away from civilization has always been vast, primitive,
and also somewhat threatening. Cf. Klein, supra note __ at 1374-75 (discussing characterizations of
wilderness areas as “primeval” and as excluding “all traces of human society”); BOTKIN, supra note __
at___. The romanticism is palpable in such impulses, but it is unrelated to the protection of nature in its
dynamic, disturbed state. And it is generally contrary to Orwell’s famous insistence that, in political
language, “[w]hat is above all needed is to let the meaning choose the words and not the other way about.”
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authentically wild is privately owned (by those with no intention of selling).126
Furthermore, making verifiable findings of fact that particular parcels of land remain a
sublime “community of life . . . untrammeled by man” is problematic.127 After all, “the
imagination has an important part to play in our perception of what is immense, nebulous,
beyond exact description.”128 Imagination, though, cannot define such preserves129 and it
cannot help a rational actor justify such a finding in America’s legal culture.130 Most of
the public lands have become intimately linked to human disturbance and were so before
1964.131 Lastly, many powerful interests and cohesive local communities are opposed to
George Orwell, Politics and the English Language, in GEORGE ORWELL: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 156,
169 (Harvest) (1971). Compare McClaran, supra note __ at 885 (describing the formation of the
“Wilderness Impact Research Foundation,” a lobby formed to gather and disseminate information on the
costs and “harms” of wilderness designations) with NASH, supra note __ at 253 (“Wilderness areas,
according to a 1970 observer, were meccas for a “pilgrimage into our species’ past.””).
126
John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 519, 559
(1996) (“Depending on which yardstick is utilized, between 10 and 20 percent of the continental United
States may today be characterized as wilderness. A substantial portion of it—perhaps as much as half—is
privately owned.”).
127
Robinson described in depth some of the Forest Service’s specific encounters in the first designation
process up to and including the litigation in Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970),
aff’d, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972). Parker is a notable interpretation
of the Wilderness Act because it inferred certain protective duties on the Forest Service with respect to
areas being considered for inclusion in the NWPS (so-called “Wilderness Study Areas”). See BEAN &
ROWLAND, supra note __ at 317. Robinson’s account of the Forest Service’s Wilderness Act
implementation is somewhat critical, at one point tacitly accusing the agency of interpreting the definition
of “wilderness” too literally as a way of limiting the total acreage that would be suitable for inclusion in the
system (and thereby maximizing its own discretion). See Robinson, supra note __ at 21-25; see also BEAN
& ROWLAND, supra note __ at 322-29. Indeed, even the Park Service’s involvement with the Act became
bitterly politicized. See SELLARS, supra note __ at 191-94 (detailing the divide that arose within the Park
Service over the enactment and administration of the Wilderness Act).
128
WILTON & BARRINGER, supra note __ at 13.
129
See DANIEL B. BOTKIN, DISCORDANT HARMONIES: A NEW ECOLOGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
(1990) (emphasizing human disturbance and dynamism in nature and suggesting that conservation practice
must reconceptualize the goal of preserving the wild); DAVID S. WILCOVE, THE CONDOR’S SHADOW: THE
LOSS AND RECOVERY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1999) (same); cf. Stephen M. Meyer, End of the Wild, 29
BOSTON REV. 20, 21 (2004) (“Although we have been aware of species losses for decades, only recently
has it become apparent that the biotic world as we have known it is collapsing.”); Peter M Vitousek et al.,
Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCIENCE 494 (1997).
130
“The modern environmental law movement was born partly from fear of pollution and partly from
distrust: distrust of industry and distrust of governmental efforts and reassurances.” LAZARUS, supra note
__ at 87. But this distrust and favor of proof burdens and “hard looks” cut both ways. See Antonin Scalia,
Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345.
131
See generally WILCOVE, supra note __. It bears mentioning that much of the land “reserved” or later
acquired into the public lands portfolios had been badly abused before its inclusion in the public systems,
necessitating restoration. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note __ ; CLARY, supra note __ at 50-53. But as
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the enclosure and preservation of range, timber, and parklands under the aesthetics of the
NWPS.132 Indeed, this may be what keeps resistance so high nationally to “devolution”
and local control in public lands law.133 And because Congress specifically reserved to
itself the authority to designate lands into the NWPS,134 the conflicts surrounding
wilderness preservation are often incorrigible.135

B. Saving Nature from Whom?
Congress’s protection of the sublime in nature was just getting started with the
Wilderness Act, though. From 1964-76, Congress would create a Public Land Law
Review Commission (“PLLRC”),136 enact the National Wildlife Refuge System

Forest Service designations of “primitive” areas grew in sophistication, its personnel showed an increasing
sensitivity toward evidence of past human manipulation and disturbance. And, indicative of the agency’s
priorities, the original headquarters regulation governing field agents in their management of these
primitive areas, “Regulation L-20,” did not “prevent the orderly use of timber, forage, and water resources”
but rather only “unnecessary road building and forms of special use of a commercial character” that would
be overt and obvious impairments of the land’s aesthetics. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __339
n.1825.
132
See Colburn, Indignity, supra note__ at 458-60; KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __
at 172-86 (describing local strongholds of resistance to wilderness designations in Montana and Utah).
133
See, e.g., Brett C. Birdsong, Road Rage and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility for
Resolving Road Claims on Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 531-46 (2005) (describing “uncertainty
and angst” surrounding agency efforts to devolve decision making authority to states and communities in
resolving contested claims to rights-of-way/roads over public lands); George C. Coggins, Regulating
Federal Natural Resources: A Summary Case Against Devolved Collaboration, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 602
(1999); cf. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 253 (“Of course, the ultimate
devolutionary action under the Endangered Species Act is to delist species, which returns management
responsibility from the federal government to the states.”). Part __ briefly summarizes the likelihoods of
further “devolutionary reform” in the public lands systems.
134
16 U.S.C. § 1132(c).
135
The procedures for actually moving areas into the NWPS following the formal administrative inventory
and study turned (and still turn) on the Congress’s and President’s reactions to any assessment(s) of the
managing agency. See John D. Leshy, Wilderness and Its Discontents—Wilderness Review Comes to the
Public Lands, 1981 ARIZ.ST. L.J. 361.
136
Pub. L. No. 86-606, 78 Stat. 982 (1964). The Chair of (and chief impetus behind the law chartering) the
PLLRC was Congressman Wayne Aspinall, a noted opponent of Executive withdrawals of land as
“monuments” and wilderness. Aspinall characterized the mandate to his commission as a charge seeking
“a comprehensive review of the public land laws of the United States and of the rules, regulations,
practices, and procedures under which those laws are administered, and recommending to the President and
to the Congress any revisions that may be considered necessary.” Wayne N. Aspinall, The Public Land
Law Review Commission: Origins and Goals, 7 NAT. RES. J. 149, 149 (1967). The final report was
supported by a great deal of original research, chief among which was a massive study by Cornell history
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Administration Act (“NRWSAA”),137 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,138 the National
Trails System Act,139 the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),140 the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act,141 the Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources
Planning Act (“FRRRPA”),142 the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”),143 the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act (“FLPMA”),144 and, of course, the Endangered
Species Act (“ESA”).145 This burst of legislation comprises public lands law’s
commitment to conservation to this day, one that fragments nature grouping some of the
parts into regimes of protection and some into regimes of consumption.146 Its underlying
structure is the unmistakable continuation of Progressivism, delineating ‘resources’ and
assigning them each distinct normative regimes and ‘expert’ stewards.147

professor Paul Gates. See PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
But the Commission was still regarded as having done political work. See Perry R. Hagenstein, One Third
of the Nation’s Land: Evolution of a Policy Recommendation, 12 NAT. RES. J. 56 (1972).
137
The NWRSAA took the form of Sections 4-9 of the ESPA. See Pub.L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926, 927-30
(1966), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd, 668ee.
138
Pub.L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-87.
139
Pub.L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-49.
140
Pub.L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 854 (1970), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f. NEPA’s purposes
preamble explicitly invoked “the profound impact of man’s activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth” and “resource
exploitation,” forces that had to be checked if the “conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony” were to be achieved. Id. at § 101(a), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
141
Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 894 (1972), codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (hereinafter
Clean Water Act or “CWA”). Notably, the Clean Water Act was one of the first federal statutes to
articulate the restoration of “biological integrity” as a regulatory objective. Robert L. Fischman, The
Meanings of Biological Integrity, Diversity, and Environmental Health, 44 NAT. RES. J. 989, 1010 (2004).
EPA’s record for implementing that aspect of the CWA in any of the nation’s waters (irrespective of
ownership or jurisdiction), though, has been subject to wilting criticism. See Robert W. Adler, The Two
Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33
ENVTL. L. 29, (2003).
142
Pub.L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 et seq. (1974), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687.
143
Pub.L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 et seq. (1976), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614.
144
Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2044 et seq. (1976), codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
145
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 et seq. (1973), codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq. Important changes
to the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) came in 1978, 1979, and 1982, after what I have marked as the
formative period. The thrust of the amendments to the ESA, though, was rather reactionary and separate
from the preservationism of 1964-76. See infra note __.
146
See Doremus, Science of Listing, supra note __ at 1088-1112.
147
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
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Even with greater popular appreciation of the fallibility of expertise,148 the
mandates were issued in terms, each system with its own “law to apply.”149 The resultant
opportunities for litigation surrounding every significant management choice were the
real turning point.150 If “rule of law” litigation has been the defining force of modern
environmental law,151 public lands law became its archetype following the legislation of
1964-76.152 Nowhere does environmental law better showcase what many have called its
culture of adversarialism and distrust.153
The public and expert opinions that prompted this legislative turn were varied in
substance, certainly. Species loss played a major role in arguments from the publicists
and promoters of NEPA, NWRSAA, and the three versions of the ESA (in 1966, 1969

148

Cf. Fred P. Bosselman & A. Dan Tarlock, The Influence of Ecological Science on American Law: An
Introduction, 69 CHI.-KENT L.REV. 847, 869-71 (1994) (describing the arrival of a “non-equilibrium
paradigm” in environmentalism in the 1970s); see supra notes __ and accompanying text.
149
In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the Court narrowed the agency
discretion exception to the presumption of reviewability embodied in the Administrative Procedure Act
(“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2), by concluding that a statutory clause requiring the Secretary of
Transportation to find “no feasible and prudent alternative” before routing highways through parks supplied
the reviewing court with “law to apply.” 401 U.S. at 417.
150
If the New Deal’s principal regulatory device (the administrative agency) was merely the
institutionalization of Progressive-era ideals, its faith in the ameliorative powers of judicial review
thoroughly transformed those ideals. See LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
(1965). By the time capture theory had gripped Washington, judicial review was the most self-evident
antidote, even though it was by then widely acknowledged that “[a]n administrative action which “favors”
an industry or some defined portion of it can usually be adequately explained as expressing a “correct”
application of the statute or a theory of regulation which is administratively rather than industry
determined.” Id. at 11; see also Peter H. Schuck, Public Interest Groups and the Policy Process, 37 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 132 (1977); Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). And though NFMA, FLPMA, and several other public
lands statutes lacked citizen suit provisions of their own, the judiciary by then had been inferring rights of
“general statutory review” from the APA itself for anyone with standing to sue. See Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (construing 5 U.S.C. § 704 as authorizing a right
of action for the review of any agency action, including rulemaking, where the constitutional minimums of
standing were present); Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 1667, 1723-24 (1975).
151
See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 79-84 (2004).
152
See A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Environmental ‘Rule of Law’ Litigation, 19 PACE L. REV. 575, 599607 (2002).
153
LAZARUS, supra note __ at 87.
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and 1973154).155 But the exhaustive report released by the PLLRC in 1970 proposing 137
distinct changes to the system of public lands law stands alone among the catalysts.156
Many of its recommendations have served as blueprints for state and federal land
agencies ever since.157 Habitat alteration and disturbance were of secondary concern at
most.158 The most consistent theme of the PLLRC report had nothing to do with
biodiversity or habitat loss; it was the promotion of greater formalization in the land
management agencies’ planning programs.159

154

The Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (“ESPA”),
was, essentially, a declaration that the “conservation, protection, restoration, and propagation of selected
species of native fish and wildlife” threatened with extinction was the “policy of Congress.” Id. at § 1(a)
(emphasis added); YAFFEE, supra note __ at 39-42. Congress tasked the Interior Department’s Committee
on Rare and Endangered Wildlife Species with assembling the first sanctioned list of “native fish or
wildlife . . . threatened with extinction.” ESPA § 1(c). Congress also admonished the Departments of
Interior, Agriculture, and Defense that “insofar as is practicable and consistent with the primary purposes of
such bureaus, agencies, and services” within those Departments, they “shall preserve the habitats of such
species on lands within their jurisdiction.” ESPA § 1(b). And it “consolidated the authorities relating the
various categories of areas” administered as wildlife habitat into one “National Wildlife Refuge System.”
Id. at § 4. Three years later Congress broadened this pronouncement’s scope in the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (“ESCA”). YAFFEE, supra note __ at
42-47. In addition to expanding the list of eligible species, it augmented the importance the secretaries of
State and Interior were to attach to foreign countries’ activities and species threatened with “worldwide
extinction.” BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note __ at 196-97. Perhaps most importantly, it occasioned the
conference which drafted the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora (“CITES”), a convention that has become “an international system of import and export permits that
created a control structure to regulate international commerce in species designated for protection.” J.
Michael Scott et al., Introduction, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra note __ at 3, 7.
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KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 22-25, 48-78; YAFFEE, supra note __;
FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 45-48; Scott et al., supra note __ at 6 (“By the middle of the 1950s, the [FWS]
was holding press conferences and newspapers were reporting the annual count of whooping cranes . . . .”).
156
See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS BY THE
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION (U.S. Govt. Print. Office, June 1970) (hereinafter “ONE THIRD OF
THE NATION' S LAND”).
157
See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 18 (5th ed.
2002) (“The Commission’s 389 page Report . . . has been analyzed, discussed, dissected, criticized, and
cited more than any other like document, and it is still a primary research resource for the serious
student.”). The report was aimed principally at the so-called “multiple use lands” of the Forest Service and
the BLM. “Preservation” lands like those in the NPS were treated only tangentially. Id.
158
WILKINSON, supra note __; KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __;
159
The very first recommendations were that Congress legislate clearly articulated goals for particular land
systems and that it legislatively mandate long range planning to achieve those goals based on specified
factors and considerations. See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND supra note __ at 42-48.
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Whether through the making of rules and regulations formalizing their
operations,160 the clarification and deepening of appeals procedures,161 the setting of
proof burdens, study requirements and the like,162 or admonitions back to Congress for
clearer statutory preferences for uses and use priorities,163 the PLLRC argued that what
was public regarding was greater proceduralization and legal determinacy. Its individual
prescriptions to this effect164 were a laundry list of complaints about how indeterminacy
and agency discretion had made a mess of public land administration since the proverbial
closing of the Frontier.165 Clear priorities had to be set so that stakeholders and experts

160

See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND, supra note __ at 251-52. “Congress should require public land
management agencies to utilize rulemaking to the fullest extent possible in interpreting statutes and
exercising delegated discretion, and should provide legislative restrictions to insure compliance with this
goal.” Id. at 251.
161
“Perhaps the most consistent complaint heard at the public meetings was that the review procedures
provided for by the administrative review systems of the [BLM] and the Forest Service were largely
illusory because those who sat in judgment on “appeal” were part of the establishment that made or
participated in the initial decision.” ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND supra note __ at 254. “To the
extent that wholly independent review of agency decisions is needed, we believe court review is more
direct and more consistent with our constitutional view of the separation of powers.” Id.
162
See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND supra note __ at 80.
163
See ONE THIRD OF THE NATION' S LAND supra note __ at 48-52. Probably the most ambitious (and
naïve) of the PLLRC’s proposals was the creation of a single, unitary Department of Natural Resources
joining the Forest Service and the rest of the land management agencies under one department within the
executive branch and one oversight committee in each house of Congress. See ONE THIRD OF THE
NATION’S LAND, supra note __ at 282-85. This, the Commission argued, would be “in the interest of good
government” because the fragmentation of congressional committee jurisdiction, no less than the
fragmentation of departmental jurisdiction, was “a major cause of public land laws not being fully
correlated with each other.” Id. at 284-85. FDR himself had rejected such a proposal by his Secretary of
Interior Harold Ickes a half-century before. SELLARS, supra note __ at 146.
164
An account of the PLLRC’s process and deliberations is given in Hagenstein, supra note ___. “Zoning a
portion of the public forest lands for timber as the dominant use was seen as a means of reaching practical
accommodation of competing multiple uses on forest lands, the category of land for which competition is
greatest.” Id. at 68. Whether it was timber, irrigation, mining, game, recreation, or range, experiences with
multiple use had proven, across the different agency experiences, that conflict was the norm in the absence
of clearly articulated hierarchies of ends to which lands should be dedicated and/or set boundaries. In its
1970 University View of the Forest Service, the Bolle Committee studied one particular national forest in
depth: the Bitterroot National Forest in western Montana. From its vantage, not only had the Forest Service
acted irrationally in its bias toward unsustainable, uneconomic logging in that unit (the Bolle Committee
argued that the Forest Service had even failed to achieve the greatest timber yield possible on the land).
The agency had also over-controlled its local managers (District Rangers) and made their decision-making
so bureaucratic as to be opaque to and unchangeable by local people. See Bolle Committee Report, supra
note __ at 25-27.
165
The PLLRC’s goal of integrating the different systems and bureaus under a single departmental
umbrella was a composite of desires to promote efficiency and the integration of the various bureaus’
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could jointly pursue their fixed ends on the various kinds of land drawn up within set
boundaries.166
The report sums up what Congress delivered from 1964-76: it legislated
procedure, issue-focused planning, preservation of nature’s exceptional, and
administrative and judicial appeals.167 Today, “[f]ew attributes of public land organic
legislation better characterize the modern era than comprehensive planning mandates.”168
It all might have had an ameliorative effect on public lands law, especially in terms of
agency accountability.169 Strikingly, though, it has had the opposite effect. Conflict may
be an inherent part of any decision involving natural resources170 and it may even be
susceptible to productive use.171 But strategic behavior in conflict deters transparency
and cooperation,172 a fact that defines our public lands’ legal regime today.

expert offices and to render the resulting organizational structure more transparent and better able to serve
“the public.” ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note __ at 282.
166
The PLLRC’s 137th recommendation was the creation of “citizen advisory boards” which would serve
as “two-way channels of communication.” ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note __ at 288. Out
of concern that such boards would be dominated by persons with concentrated stakes likely to capture the
agencies, the Commission recommended that their members be chosen to “represent a broad range of
interests” and that representation change “as interest in, and uses of, the land change.” Id. at 289. Nothing
so superficial, however, would even possibly address the problems of agenda-setting within administrative
agencies by those with concentrated stakes—a conclusion many were reaching starting in the late 1970s.
See MASHAW, supra note __ at 23-29.
167
See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 186-208; COGGINS ET AL., supra note __ at
137-44; supra notes __ and accompanying text.
168
FISCHMAN, supra note __ at 100.
169
See HABERMAS, supra note __ at __ (describing a need in mass franchise electoral systems for
procedural regulations in the conduct of public debate); Brulle, supra note __ at 15.
170
See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at __; LEE, supra note __ at 87; Karkkainen,
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance, supra note __ at __.
171
See LEE, supra note __ at 90-114 (discussing “bounded conflict” and its instrumental virtues for public
problem solving).
172
See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). Elites’ choices to take extreme or
“bargaining” positions in national debates exert significant shaping influences on the nature and
deliberative potential of those debates. HABERMAS, supra note __ at 336-51; LEE, supra note __ at 182
(describing the destructive effects of “unbounded conflict” where the arena of dispute is unlimited and
disputants have no incentive to compromise or cooperate). More than one study has reached this judgment
about conservation politics over the last generation. See BRULLE, supra note __ at 273; DOWIE, supra note
__ at 251-57. And several critiques of the administrative process suggest it has played a significant role in
fostering such strategic behavior. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld,
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C. Planning and Habitat: Prediction, the Unpredictable, and Accountability
In hindsight, what makes the PLLRC’s logic so mystifying is that it clearly
wished the multiple use agencies would deepen their commitments to conservation.173
The thinking must have been that making everything a priority and requiring that binding
plans be laid to pursue it all was the best available satisfice.174 And, if so, the NFMA
amendments were the upshot of this logic because they studiously avoided establishing
any order of priority among uses while simultaneously requiring the agency to provide
for them all.175

Empowering Stakeholders: Limits on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 411 (2000). An internal Forest Service memo complained as much in 2004. See The Process
Predicament, supra note __ at 25-32.
173
The Commission wrote that, “[f]ollowing preference to rare and endangered species, preference should
be given to the support of those species for which the public lands provide a critical or significant portion
of the habitat.” ONE THIRD OF THE NATION’S LAND, supra note __ at 160. This concern for imperiled
species would eventually motivate some of the sponsors of the NFMA amendments as well. FEDKIW, supra
note __ at 109-12.
174
For an explanation of why this has usually failed as a conservation strategy, see JOHN TERBORGH,
REQUIEM FOR NATURE (1999). The failure has not deterred advocates from making such prescriptions the
centerpiece of their continuing criticisms, though. Cf. Blumm, supra note __ at 430 (“A redefinition of
multiple use should be encouraged through the implementation of the Endangered Species Act, the Clean
Water Act, and [NFMA’s] fish and wildlife directives.”) (internal footnotes omitted); see infra notes __ and
accompanying text.
175
The Forest and Rangelands Renewable Resources Planning Act (“FRRRPA” or “RPA”) first mandated
long-range, system-wide planning for the National Forest System in 1974. See 88 Stat. 476 et seq. The law
required the Forest Service to generate three kinds of planning documents for the National Forest System
on a decennial interval: (1) an assessment of the renewable resources on all forest and rangelands, (2) a
program of long-range objectives, and (3) an annual report evaluating Forest Service activities thereon. See
National Wildlife Fed’n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This long-term mandate had also
been boosted by the PLLRC and was no doubt motivated by considerable idealism when enacted (although
it eventually became an annual target of appropriations riders disabling it). See COGGINS ET AL., supra note
__ at 712-13. With the NFMA amendments, though, the planning duties were devolved to a shorter-term,
unit-by-unit, region-by-region framework that was supposed to utilize “a systematic interdisciplinary
approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and other sciences.” Pub. L.
No. 93-378, § 6(b), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b). It is this framework that has been adopted by the other
land management systems in public lands law. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at __.
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Just after legislating the ESA (and before TVA v. Hill showed what ESA § 7 really
meant176), Congress legislated NFMA § 6. It required unit-by-unit land management
planning that was to provide for both habitat and multiple-use forestry.177 It specifically
required a “systematic interdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of
physical, biological, economic, and other sciences” in utilizing NFS lands.178 The core
deliverable was that, according to uniform guidelines179 structuring “Land and Resource

176

The 1973 ESA included basic versions of its present habitat protection structures, including a skeletal
version of ESA § 7. See BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note __ at 198-213. Originally, ESA § 7 was a single
paragraph. 87 Stat. 884, 892. And while TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), was not the first decision
enjoining federal agency action under Section 7, it was by far the most notorious. In National Wildlife
Fedn. v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), the Fifth Circuit enjoined the Department of
Transportation from funding road projects that would promote the degradations of sandhill crane habitat.
But it was the 1978 Hill decision that galvanized public opposition to the ESA’s “prohibitory policies” on
habitat—eventually turning ESA § 7 into the “maze of procedural requirements” it is today. KLEIN ET AL.,
supra note __ at 795; see also George C. Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in
Pork Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEO. L.J. 1433 (1982); Ronald H.
Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened Species,
58 N.C. L. REV. 491 (1980).
177
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 371-73; Tuholske & Brennan, supra note __ at 60-66.
FLPMA did as much for BLM lands. FLPMA directed that BLM “shall, with public involvement and
consistent with the terms and conditions of this Act, develop . . . land use plans which provide by tracts or
areas for the use of the public lands.” 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a). The planning requirements FLPMA leveled on
BLM were loosely based upon those found in NFMA, although the far greater intrusion upon BLM
discretion has been NEPA. See COGGINS ET AL., supra note __at 800-08. Fast after FLPMA came the
Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978 (“PRIA”), Pub. L. No. 95-514, 92 Stat. 1808 et seq. Between
FLPMA, NEPA and PRIA, BLM was given an overall “goal” for its rangelands planning: to make its lands
“as productive as feasible in accordance with rangeland management objectives established through the
land use planning process,” 43 U.S.C. § 1093(b), which were to include the “potential for livestock,
wildlife habitat, recreation, forage, and water and soil conservation,” id. at § 1901(a)(1), “multiple use and
sustained yield,” id. at § 1712(c)(1), “the integrated consideration of physical, biological, economic, and
other sciences,” id. at § 1712(c)(2), and “compliance with applicable pollution control laws,” id. at §
1712(c)(8), together with the obligation to complete Environmental Impact Statements at appropriate
junctures.
178
Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 6(b), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b). In 1972, the Service had more than double
as many trained foresters as other experts—from soil science to economics—combined (over 5,000 to about
2,000). FEDKIW, supra note __ at 31. By the 1980s and 1990s, measured in “full time equivalents” (FTEs),
the staffing gains in these other disciplines doubled in some cases and were partially offset by the
reductions in range management and timber program staffing. Id. at 191. Still, the first Committee of
Scientists several times voiced concern about the Forest Service’s capacity to summon the expertise that
would be needed to fulfill the analytical burdens it was setting for itself in requirements like the viable
populations of MIS rule. See 44 Fed. Reg. at 53975; infra notes __ and accompanying text.
179
Different parts of NFMA § 6 required the Forest Service to provide “assurances” regarding the plans,
see 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e), and that plans all have various “required provisions.” Id. at § 1604(f). But
NFMA § 6(g) required that the Forest Service “shall in accordance with the procedures set forth in section
553 of Title 5 promulgate regulations . . . that set out the process for development and revision of the
[plans].” Id. at § 1604(g). This sort of explicit requirement of notice and comment rulemaking grew
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Management Plans” (“LRMPs”), each local management unit “provide for diversity of
plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land
area in order to meet overall multiple-use objectives . . . .”180 The Forest Service wrote,
rewrote, and is still rewriting those guidelines, though.181 Ecologists cannot say how
much “diversity” is enough or how much is “natural.”182 Thus, local and regional

increasingly popular both with Congress and the Executive in the 1970s. Viewed by some as “one of the
greatest inventions of modern government,” KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 65-66 (1969), notice and comment was hailed as an innovative technique for
integrating public input and expertise in the writing of agency rules having the force of law. But its
“ossification” and domination by more sophisticated stakeholders soon began to undermine confidence in
its effectiveness as such a tool. See Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture:
The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. REG. 257 (1987).
180
Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 6(g), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
181
The first proposed rule came in August 1978. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land and
Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 43 Fed. Reg. 39046 (1978). The Committee of Scientists
delivered its Final Report in February 1979, leading to a reproposal of the rule in May 1979. See Forest
Service, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 44 Fed. Reg.
26554 (1979). That rule was finalized with changes in September 1979. See Forest Service, National
Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, Final Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 53928 (1979). With the
changing of administrations in 1981, though, the rule was brought up for amendment by the “Presidential
Task Force on Regulatory Relief.” In February 1982, the Reagan Administration’s proposed rule was
announced. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning,
Proposed Rule, 47 Fed. Reg. 7678 (1982). Though it had disbanded, the members of the Committee of
Scientists were formally invited “as individual consultants to discuss and consider” the proposed changes.
See Forest Service, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule;
Extension of Comment Period and Notice of Meeting, 47 Fed. Reg. 24348 (1982). That rule was finalized
with changes in September 1982. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land and Resource
Management Planning, Final Rule 47 Fed. Reg. 43026 (1982). By 1991, the Service was proposing to
overhaul the rule. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning,
Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 56 Fed. Reg. 6508 (1991). With the changing of
administrations, a different proposal appeared in 1995. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land
and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 18886 (1995). This proposal attracted a
lot of comment, though, and a second Committee of Scientists was empanelled the report from which
delivered in March 1999 was used to repropose the rule in November 1999. See Forest Service, National
Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 54074, 54075
(1999). That rule was finalized in 2000, see Forest Service, National Forest System Land and Resource
Management Planning, Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 67514 (2000), but it was immediately stayed with the
changing of administrations and a new rule re-proposed. See Forest Service, National Forest System Land
and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 67 Fed. Reg. 72770 (2002). That rule was not
finalized until after the 2004 Presidential election, see Forest Service, National Forest System Land and
Resource Management Planning, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023 (2005), and its validity is still in doubt.
See Defenders of Wildlife et al. v. Johanns, No. 04-4512 PJH (N.D. Cal.2005) (complaint filed).
182
It was the Committee of Scientists that urged the Forest Service to remove the term “natural” from its
first draft definition of “diversity.” See 44 Fed. Reg. at 53975. Indeed, there was then and still is genuine
concern about even measuring biodiversity at the level of species. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 67546 (stating
Service conclusion that it is “financially and technically impractical to individually assess each species”);
cf. Reed F. Noss, Hierarchical Indicators for Measuring Changes in Biodiversity, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, supra note __ at 28 (“[T]wo things about biodiversity should be clear: (1) it is
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personnel are held to account, through notice-and-comment-like procedures, to uniform
guidelines that lack real scientific foundations—in essence, being asked to discover the
unknown under conditions of distrust and disagreement.183
The guidelines originally specified that unit managers should “ensure that viable
populations of native and desirable nonnative vertebrate species will be maintained”184
and that planning units should “support, at least, a minimum number of reproductive
individuals” with habitat “well distributed so that those individuals can interact with
others in the planning area.”185 Yet, as field office personnel learned the hard way, the
habitat needs of different species are often incompatible with one another and/or so
uncertain that entire planning areas can be taken up by the (known) habitat requirements
of only a few populations—assuming the viability analyses are actually done.186 Their

complex, and (2) it is always changing. How on earth can a conservation biologist or land manager deal
with this mess?”).
183
Moreover, even granting a policy of no net biodiversity loss per unit is feasible and appropriate, it is
unclear that any administrative agency imaginable—let alone one as under-budgeted and internally
conflicted as the Forest Service—could do much to preserve diversity parcel-by-parcel. See Daniel
Goodman, The Demography of Chance Extinction, in MINIMUM VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION
11 (Michael E. Soule ed., 1987) (describing the “minimum viable population” problem and the fact that
most populations are characterized by demographic variables of uncertain magnitude); see also Forest
Service, National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, Proposed Rule, 60 Fed. Reg.
18886, 18895 (1995) (“As a practical matter . . . a requirement to ‘insure’ viable populations . . . envisions
an outcome impossible to be guaranteed by any agency, regardless of the analytical resources marshalled
[sic].”); THOMAS, supra note __ (arguing that unparalleled levels of interagency coordination will be
necessary to preserve biodiversity on most public lands).
184
44 Fed. Reg. at 53990 (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.13(b) (repealed by Forest Service, Final Rule,
National Forest System Land and resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514 (2000)) (emphasis
added)). But by the 1990s, the agency had concluded that “[t]he extensive and expensive amount of
scientific expertise, data, and technology needed for conducting species viability assessments as currently
described in the scientific literature is far beyond what was originally envisioned by the Committee of
Scientists when developing the planning rule.” 60 Fed. Reg. at 18895.
185
36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1999).
186
Population viability analysis and MIS selection both became central parts of the attacks on planning.
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 800-803 (5th Cir. 1994); Inland Empire Public Lands Co. v.
United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir.
1997); Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997). As the Sierra Club
argued in one of its many cases, “biological diversity can only be maintained if a given habitat is
sufficiently large so that populations within that habitat will remain viable in the event of disturbances.”
Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606, 610 (7th Cir. 1995). The complementary proposition it omitted is that
these area requirements, given the fragmentation of the NFS, can easily exceed available “planning areas,”
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choices of and approaches toward “management indicator species” soon seemed to
skeptics like just another means for rationalizing the cultivated forest.187 By trying to
comply with its own regulations, though, “[p]lanning had become too time-consuming
and expensive, too unresponsive to public input, and too little used—the plans, once all
the efforts to formulate them had been expended, mostly take up shelf space.”188
NFMA’s diversity requirement and the Forest Service regulations implementing it
provoked so much rancor189 that, by 1995, the Service was convinced that its biggest
reform was to lower the public’s expectations of forest planning.190
In this light, it seems deliberate that the statute left “diversity” undefined.191 Just
the sustained conflicts of NFMA planning have involved the legal force of the plans,192

leaving little room for the other four elements of MUSYA’s “multiple use” under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g) and
538—at least as long as the agency confines its attention to its own lands. See Mark Shaffer, MVPs:
Coping With Uncertainty, in VIABLE POPULATIONS FOR CONSERVATION at 69 (Michael E. Soulé ed., 1987).
187
Lacking any trust in the Forest Service, user and affinity groups soon found they could at least get a
hearing in federal court on the arbitariness of selecting particular MISs. See, e.g., Idaho Sporting Cong. v.
Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2002); Sierra Club v. Martin, 168 F.3d 1 (11th Cir. 1999); Inland
Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, (9th Cir. 1996). Tragically,
though, at least one empirical study of the use of proxies as “indicators” of ecosystem diversity or integrity
found that they are of no more provable scientific merit than random selections. See Sandy J. Andelman
and William F. Fagan, Umbrellas and Flagships: Efficient Conservation Surrogates or Expensive
Mistakes?, 97 PROC. OF NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5954 (2000).
188
Charles F. Wilkinson, A Case Study in the Intersection of Law and Science: The 1999 Report of the
Committee of Scientists, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 307, 308 (2000). Wilkinson sat on the second Committee of
Scientists. Id. at 308 n.8.
189
See, e.g., Michael J. Mortimer, The Delegation of Law-Making Authority to the United States Forest
Service: Implications in the Struggle for National Forest Management, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 907 (2002)
(describing the history of challenges to Forest Service planning and project-level decision-making
stemming from habitat degradation complaints); VAUGHN & CORTNER, supra note __ at 59-68 (compiling
data of Forest Service appeals).
190
See Forest Service, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, National Forest System Land and
Resource Management Planning, 56 Fed. Reg. 6508, 6512-13 (1991) (describing Forest Service
conclusions, reached after a comprehensive “regulatory review,” that the public’s expectations of forest
planning had to be adjusted downward).
191
This gap in the law is one NFMA shares with NRWSIA and which analysts of the NWRS have said
represents FWS’s “greatest challenge.” Robert L. Fischman, The Meanings of Biological Integrity,
Diversity and Environmental Health, 44 NAT. RES. J. 989, 992 (2004) (hereinafter Fischman, “Meanings”);
but cf. WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note __ at 295-96 (noting that NFMA contains no definition of
“diversity” but arguing that the legislative history indicates the “overall purpose” of NFMA § 6 was to
direct the Forest Service to treat wildlife as a “controlling, co-equal factor in forest management and, in
particular, as a substantive limitation on timber production”). The original Committee of Scientists
empanelled to propose regulations implementing NFMA observed that “[d]iversity is one of the more
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the means selected for measuring “diversity” and maintaining it,193 and the compatibility
of roads, timber sales, recreation, and other land uses with habitat.194 Unsurprisingly,
challenges to the agency’s judgments on species diversity came to turn on the brand of
deference the reviewing court afforded it.195

perplexing issues dealt with in these regulations.” Final Report of the Committee of Scientists, 44 Fed.
Reg. 26599, 26608 (1979). “No matter how diversity is defined, its measurement is complex.” Id. at
26609. Eventually, the Forest Service began arguing that courts should defer to its choice of species to be
benefited by its management choices because trade-offs of the kind are inevitable. Cf. Sierra Club v. Espy,
38 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1994) (deferring to Forest Service as to compliance with the diversity
requirement):
In the absence of forest management [i.e., logging], trees would grow older, the character of plant
and animal diversity would change, and some wildlife would decline in numbers. Harvesting trees
[through clear cutting] necessarily results in younger stands. Wildlife dependent on younger
stands would flourish at the expense of species dependent on older growth forests. . . . These forest
dynamics make clear that protecting forest resources involves making trade-offs.
192
NFMA said nothing specifically about the legal force of its required “Land and Resource Management
Plans.” NFMA § 14(a) states that the Forest Service must provide, “by regulation,” for “procedures,
including public hearings where appropriate, to give Federal, State, and local governments and the public
adequate notice and opportunity to comment upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines
applicable to Forest Service programs.” 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a). It also requires that the agency “provide for
public participation in the development, review, and revision of [LRMPs],” 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e), that
“[r]esource plans and permits, contracts, and other instruments for the use and occupancy of National
Forest System lands shall be consistent with the land management plans,” id. at § 1604(i), but it says
nothing going directly to the question of a plan’s legal force and effect. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson,
28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994) (challenge to Article III standing of Sierra Club to challenge LRMP); Coalition
for Sustainable Resources v. U.S. Forest Service, 259 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that Forest
Service failure to revise LRMP at a pace timely enough to protect habitat of ESA listed species was
unreviewable agency “inaction” under the APA); but see Lands Council v. Powell, 379 F.3d 738 (9th Cir.
2004), as amended, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005).
193
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. 1997); Public Lands Council v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Ohio 1994); Oregon
Natural Resources Co. v. Lowe, 836 F. Supp. 727 (D. Ore. 1993); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 784 F. Supp.
593 (W.D. Ark. 1991); Cronin v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990); Sierra Club v. Marita,
843 F. Supp. 1536 (E.D. Wis. 1994) consolidated with Sierra Club v. Marita, 845 F. Supp. 1317 (E.D. Wis.
1994), and rev’d by Sierra Club v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995); Krichbaum v. Kelley, 844 F. Supp.
1107 (W.D. Va. 1994). The published opinions on “even-aged management” and its relationship to
management indicator species in the four National Forests in eastern Texas alone span 15 years and
constitute a day’s reading. See Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 433 F. Supp. 1235 (E.D.
Tex. 1977), rev’d, Texas Comm. on Natural Resources v. Bergland, 573 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1978); Sierra
Club v. Espy, 822 F.Supp. 356 (E.D. Tex. 1993), rev’d, Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792 (5th Cir. 1994);
Sierra Club v. Glickman, 974 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Tex. 1997), aff’d, Sierra Club v. Peterson,185 F.3d 349
(5th Cir. 1999), rev’d on reh’ing en banc, Sierra Club v. Peterson, 228 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2000).
194
See Susan Anderson et al., The National Forest Management Act: The Law of the Forest in the Year
2000, 21 J. LAND, RES. & ENVTL. L. 151, 194-95, 197-206 (2001).
195
Tuholske & Brennan, supra note __ at 125-29; Jamie Kester, Rubber-Stamping v. Probing Review—The
Judicial Role in Enforcing the Substantive Requirements of the National Forest Management Act: Lands
Council v. Powell, 16 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2005).
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In legislating this structure,196 Congress solved virtually none of the problems
confronting public lands in the wake of the technocratic vision’s eclipse. No centralized
bureau in the Service’s position could even possibly identify (let alone pursue) desirable
ecological conditions given so little guidance, so little of its many biomes to manage, and
in the face of so much distrust.197 The collective consensus may have been thin, i.e., that
the ordinary diversity and complexity of nature, if they were to be plowed under in favor
of cultivated forests, should at least get a hearing.198 But the order of priority among
articulated goals—phrased as they were in abstractions199—quickly became just another

196

NFMA § 6 is similar to FLPMA and PRIA’s planning provisions, see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1751, 1752(d),
1903, perhaps most significantly in that they are also unit-based and aimed at an organization intimately
tied to the private users of its lands. See Public Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 730-41 (2000).
197
See SAX, supra note __ at 61-90; Tuholske & Brennan, supra note __ at 67-126; Colburn, Indignity,
supra note __ at 471-87; see also THOMAS, supra note __ at 153-91 (reaching a similar conclusion about
BLM management in the Klamath and describing how cooperative strategies emerged to coordinate with
localities, powerful stakeholders, and other agencies,); A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal
Regime for a “Post-Modern” United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1285 (2004)
(reaching similar conclusion about the Army Corps of Engineers and its enabling legislation). Conservation
biologists and organizational theorists have, in concert, demonstrated how unlikely it is that agencies could
even possibly manage the dynamics involved in habitat planning on lands like those of the NFS. FLPMA
directed BLM to “use and observe the principles of multiple use and sustained yield” while giving “priority
to the designation and protection of areas of critical environmental concern.” 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712(c)(1), (2).
“Areas of critical environmental concern,” or ACECs, are defined as those tracts of land where “special
management attention is required . . . to protect and prevent irreparable damage to important historic,
cultural, or scenic values, fish and wildlife resources or other natural systems or processes. . . .” Id. at §
1702(a). ACECs are, in short, another mechanism segregating this type of dominant use out of BLM’s
baseline “multiple use” within its land management plans.
198
“Ordinary” in this sense means not extraordinary, not a part of a park, a “refuge,” “sanctuary,” a “critical
habitat,” or some other exceptional status for the land in question. See generally Colburn, Indignity, supra
note __. The “hearing” requirement in NFMA § 6 separating “even aged management” from ‘non-timber’
planning priorities became the discretionary point to which politics flowed. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The
National Forest Management Act: The Twenty Years Behind, The Twenty Years Ahead, 68 U. COLO. L.
REV. 659, 673 (1997). Indeed, conservation biologists had grown weary of the malleability of the
“ecosystem management” concept in the early 1990s. See, e.g., R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem
Management?, 8 CONSERV. BIO. 27 (1994) (describing ten different themes pervading descriptions of
natural resource management philosophies referred to as “ecosystem management” and concluding that
“‘the ecosystem management debate’ is really a complex, competitive, conflictual social process about
whose values will dominate, it is not about science”).
199
Importantly, the “diversity” prong of NFMA § 6(g) was put squarely within agency discretion in that it
only required as much “based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to meet
overall multiple-use objectives . . . .” Pub. L. No. 93-378, § 6(g), codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
This qualification was the result of Forest Service lobbying. FEDKIW, supra note _ at 110-12.
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predicate for litigation.200 This was partly because the purpose behind NFMA’s process
requirements was so uncertain201 and partly because so little is yet known about
preserving biodiversity, especially while permitting other uses of the land (which our
conservation land systems must).202
Most recently, the agency overhauled the guidelines to “deregulate” the planning
process and strip it of as much “law to apply” as possible, implicitly closing the book on
the PLLRC.203 FWS’s “Comprehensive Conservation Plans” (“CCPs”) for units of the
NWRS, required by the 1997 NWRSIA, bear many resemblances,204 as do the planning
200

See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note __ 68-69 (arguing that “intent” of the diversity requirement is
obscure and that it is likely more about clearcutting than about ecosystem integrity per se); Colburn,
Indignity, supra note __ at 475-81 (“diversity” in this context is irreducibly ambiguous); Julie A. Weis,
Eliminating the National Forest Management Act’s Diversity Requirement as a Substantive Standard, 27
ENVTL. L. 641 (1997) (criticizing the Forest Service’s initial proposal to amend the diversity requirement
regulations to make them less prescriptive); Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem
Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869 (1997) (detailing the information demands and political risks created
by management policies prioritizing habitat within the NFS). All that said, many progressives now argue
that the Forest Service has simply misinterpreted NFMA § 6’s delegation by amending its rules as it did in
2005. See Flournoy et al., supra note __ at 2-10 (arguing that Forest Service rules providing for the
protection of “native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area” became the subject of
so many law suits surrounding LRMPs because the Forest Service lacked conviction in its adherence to its
own rules).
201
Cf. HABERMAS, supra note __ at 266 (criticizing the development of a particular model of procedural
justice for its equivocation as to the underlying goals and purposes of the procedural system).
202
See supra notes __ and accompanying text. In the 2000 rule, the Service diluted the population viability
analysis requirements by explicitly linking them to “the extent of information available” and allowed
personnel to employ “general conservation principles and expert opinion” as appropriate. 65 Fed. Reg. at
67574-75. But much of the impetus for the 2002 and 2005 rule changes by the Bush Administration
stemmed from the belief (whether accurate or not) that biodiversity had become too important and was
beginning to conflict too much with other uses. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 1028-30.
203
See Forest Service, Final Rule, National Forest System Land Management Planning, 70 Fed. Reg. 1023,
1024 (2005) (“[P]lans under this final rule will be more strategic and less prescriptive in nature than under
the 1982 planning rule.”). The Forest Service expressly acknowledged its intent to deprive stakeholders of
the means to challenge plans in its 2005 overhaul. See id. at 1027 (“The traditional approach of developing
and choosing among discrete alternatives that were carried throughout the entire planning process often
proved divisive, because it often maintained adversarial positions, rather than helping people seek common
ground.”). For present purposes, the most relevant change was the elimination of the requirement that
Forest Service unit managers maintain fish and wildlife habitat sufficient to support “viable populations of
existing native and desired non-native vertebrate species in the planning area . . . .” 36 C.F.R. § 219.19
(1999). In not having to pick particular species, the agency freed itself to plan for the much more abstract
requirement of “habitat types.” The most obvious consequence of the distrust and adversarialism at the
federal level today is how hostile progressives have been to this rule change, regarding its claims to
experimentalism as a sham. See, e.g., FLOURNOY ET AL., supra note __
204
Under NWRSIA, CCPs are supposed to ensure that the “biological integrity, diversity, and
environmental health of the System are maintained. . . .” Pub. L. No. 105-57, § 5(a)(4)(B), codified at 16
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processes of the other public lands law systems.205 Yet none of these systems is actually
institutionalizing “adaptive” or “ecosystem” management. For one thing, they are too
evolutionarily isolated to do so.206 More importantly, though, none of the planning
processes require personnel to take the nonfederal lands surrounding their planning units
seriously.207 None has instituted the monitoring and information pooling that makes
adaptive management work.208 None has mounted an effective public education
campaign to regionalize definitions of desirable conditions.209 Too many of their

U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(B). But individual refuges remain bound by whatever establishment terms and
conditions exist under the individual refuges’ “law, proclamation, executive order, agreement, public land
order, donation document or administrative memorandum establishing, authorizing or expanding” the
refuge or any of its constitutive units. Id. at § 668ee(10); Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C. v. Huber, 277 F.
Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb. 2003), aff’d, 373 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2004). Interestingly, and probably because
FWS learned from the Forest Service’s mistake, CCPs and the planning guidelines have been given no
independent legal force according to FWS, presumably in the hopes of avoiding the “hard look” litigation
LRMPs have attracted. See Fish and Wildlife Service, Notice, Refuge Planning Policy, 65 Fed. Reg.
33892, 33901-02 (2000).
205
BLM’s plans are quite similar under FLPMA to what the Forest Service must complete under NFMA.
206
See supra notes __ and accompanying text. A fascinating account of the social psychology of the
fragmentation is Raymond & Fairfax, supra note __ (tracing the “fragmentation narrative” and its rhetorical
power in twentieth century public lands law debates). Much more significant, though, is the fundamental
difference in logic separating rational, technocratic (and, largely, economic) “conservation” from the more
aesthetic and spiritual “preservation.” “Rationalization . . . refers to the extension of calculative attitudes of
a technical character to more and more spheres of activity, epitomized by scientific procedures and given
substantive expression in the increasing role that expertise, science and technology play in modern life.”
HELD, supra note __ at 160. Quite outside the rational “technocratic vision,” preservationism seeks to
identify and save the sacrosanct from the threat of an ever-impending doom of cultivation. See supra notes
__ and accompanying text; cf. ROBBIN, supra note __ at 251 (“Contemporary liberals . . . speak not for, but
against; they do not aspire to the summum bonum, but seek to fend off the summum malum.”).
207
The 2000 NFS planning rule did include a requirement that planners “seek to engage private
landowners.” 65 Fed. Reg. at 67539. But the requirement was watered down considerably in response to
hostile reactions from several commenters. Id. The 2005 planning rule has no such requirement. And
while it may be true that “[s]cience has driven the growth and management of the [NWRS] to a greater
extent than other dominant-use federal lands,” Fischman, Meanings, supra not __ at 1022, not even FWS
has tried to make ecological restoration (as opposed to preservation) the goal and integrative, inclusive
management its means. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Wildlife Refuge and the Land Community, 44 NAT. RES. J.
1027 (2004).
208
See Utah Environmental Cong. v. Bosworth, 372 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting challenge to
Forest Service’s minimal monitoring commitments under LRMP). Indeed, even when plans or regulations
have had significant monitoring requirements, the courts have refused to enforce them. See, e.g., Ecology
Center, Inc. v. Forest Service, 192 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1999); Westley, supra note __ (describing the design
conditions for a “changeful organization”).
209
For example, path-breaking work is being done by researchers at the Harvard Forest in Petersham,
Massachusetts, studying the segmentation of private forest owners into various types the better to gauge
propensities for cooperation and the forms of cooperation in which different owners show a willingness to
engage. See, e.g., Andrew O. Finley et al., Interest in Cross-Boundary Cooperation: Identification of
47

powerful stakeholders have systemic complaints that can only be aired in artificially
particularized challenges.210 And if the agencies have devised any internal mechanisms
for benchmarking performance among units or regions, they are a secret.211
Managing to prevent species loss means confronting stochasticity and
fragmentation and, often, proscribing and prescribing human behaviors that lack tangible,
provable connections to any particular extirpation.212 It means managing a mosaic to
preserve or restore its integrity—something experts have been advocating for sixty
years213 but which none of the systems has actually done.214 The statutes requiring and
the administrative law guiding the formal planning processes erect massive barriers to
such approaches215 and actively deter them beyond the boundary lines.216 Public land

Distinct Types of Private Forest Owners, 52 FOREST SCIENCE 10 (2006); Daniel L. Belin et al., Assessing
Private Forest Owner Attitudes Toward Ecosystem-Based Management, 103 J. FORESTRY 28 (2005). If the
land management agencies care about such research, it is very hard to tell.
210
The legacy of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), clarified in cases like Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990), Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Ohio
Forestry Assoc. Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998), and, most recently, Norton v. Southern Utah
Wilderness Alliance, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (2004), has been the transference of national organizations’ great
energies into the narrowing confines of particularized injuries and artificially discrete “agency actions.”
See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 250-65 (1988).
211
To be sure, individual units of the national systems are doing interesting and, in some cases, pathbreaking things. See, e.g., Meretzky, et al., supra note __ at 139. But the institutional point of having a
centralized organization in the first place is unrealized unless such innovations are shared and used to
benchmark the performances of others. Dorf & Sabel, supra note __ at 345-48.
212
Cf. Shaffer, supra note __ at 83 (“Extinctions of populations and species may occur for many reasons,
among which will be chance. The recognition of the probabilistic component of extinction and its
dependence on population size and time has profound ramifications for efforts to avoid or minimize the
impending extinction crisis.”); Colburn, Indignity, supra note __ at 431-36.
213
See supra note ___.
214
See Colburn, Indignity, supra note __ at 471; KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at
303-06.
215
See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REV. __
(forthcoming); Patrick Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an
Era of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. POL’Y REV. 227, 258-60 (1997); Jamison E. Colburn,
The Future of Air Pollution Control in the Corporatist State, 34 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10577, 10578-80 (2004).
216
As Professor Appel argued, it is finding a limit on the Property Power, likely through the Tenth
Amendment, that is the much more difficult question of law in the realm of Congress’s protective powers
over federal public lands. Appel, supra note__ at 107. Thus, while “the lack of federal regulation in an area
does not mean that the power does not exist,” “only that the federal government has not pursued it,” id. at
102, it can be presumed that the government has been effectively deterred from regulating private lands
surrounding public lands—notwithstanding the many significant drawbacks. See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH
WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 208-18; COGGINS ET AL., supra note __ at 198-206; Doremus, Restoring
48

management, consequently, has become entrenched in what is best described as
gridlock.217

IV. INCLUSIVE CONSERVATION: THE POSSIBILITIES FOR PUBLIC LANDS LAW
Preservationism revolutionized when it moved to preserving biodiversity, turning
its concept of nature to be saved from humanity upon itself. For, all too often,
affirmative human actions (which are not particularly edifying) must be taken to save
imperiled creatures, species, and biomes.218 Humanity’s disturbances are ubiquitous and
growing,219 making the work of this new preservationism both infinite and ambivalent.
Our alterations of the earth are embarrassing the public lands law systems in concept,
scale, and scope while they prevent our “stewards” from adapting fast enough even to
identify a usable knowledge.220 Some will respond that the ESA was not meant to respect
bureaucratic turf or the preservation/conservation dichotomy.221 And it is no coincidence
Endangered Species, supra note __ at 59 (“Confining restored animals to federal lands . . . severely limits
the effectiveness of restoration efforts.”).
217
Wilkinson, supra note __ at 308.
218
See, e.g., Doremus, Restoring Endangered Species, supra note __ at 3 (describing captive breeding and
other restorative techniques and arguing that “[d]omestication deprives wild creatures of their aura, their
magic, the essence for which we should be protecting them”); Oelschlaeger, supra note __ at 240-44; .
Jordan argues convincingly that this is a real problem for the future of ecological restoration. “Several
notions of authenticity that have been profoundly influential in the West imply a deep skepticism regarding
representation of any kind, and lead inevitably to the devaluation of anything like a restored ecosystem that
is intended to be a reproduction or re-creation of something else.” JORDAN, supra note __ at 118.
219
See supra note __ and accompanying text.
220
See Ruhl, supra note __ at 24-34. The scale mismatches are not simply on the broad end, though. Often
what native habitat specialists require are various microenvironments that are, at once, rare in cultivated
forests and too laborious for the agency to make abundant artificially. See, e.g., Steven W. Buskirk &
Leonard F. Ruggiero, American Marten, in THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS FOR CONSERVING FOREST CARNIVORES,
supra note __ at 7, 26 (describing “witch’s brooms,” rot-weakened tree falls creating hollows in decayed
logs, as necessary denning and resting sites).
221
Cf. BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note __ at 199 (“Both its statement of congressional findings and purposes
and its definitions reflect the truly comprehensive sweep intended for the Act.”); Tennessee Valley Auth. v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (“As it was finally passed, the [ESA] represented the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”). Of course, whatever
its original purposes, bureaucratic turf and the preservation/conservation dichotomy have both heavily
influenced the ESA as well. See D. Noah Greenwald et al., The Listing Record, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra
note __ at 51.
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that the grizzly bear, the gray wolf, the spotted owl, and other predators have been the
most effective catalysts of pragmatic regional integration in public lands law since the
1970s.222 But it must be remembered that the Forest Service fought a decade of litigation
before it relented to demands for protection of uncultivated forests and spotted owl
habitat223 and that the ESA was never meant to shoulder the burdens it now does. Public
lands law must aspire to being more than just a paved road to the last resort. Section A
argues that a new, thicker conception of conservation must be allowed to set the agenda
on public lands, a conception that moves beyond the boundary lines without forgetting
that there are real limitations to federal power. Section B draws one not so sanguine
lesson from the history traced above to argue that this new conception of conservation
stands little chance of winning in the national ‘marketplace of ideas.’ Section C proposes
the alternative.

A. Ecosystem Management and Public Lands: An Empty Set
Ecology teaches that the diversity of organisms assembled in any one place and
time is the effect of an endless chain of causes and itself a cause of an endless chain of

222

Keiter, Ecosystem Management, supra note __ at 707-08.
The spotted owl’s habitat needs for breeding, feeding, and sheltering were the one concrete thing found
to be incompatible with Forest Service practices and plans in the Pacific Northwest and were, by most
accounts, the principal catalyst of the 24 million acre “Northwest Forest Plan.” See Stephen L. Yaffee,
Lessons About Leadership from the History of the Spotted Owl Controversy, 35 NAT. RES. J. 381 (1995);
Victor M. Sher, Travels with Strix: The Spotted Owl’s Journey Through the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND
L. REV. 41 (1993); Robert Fischman, Biological Diversity and Environmental Protection: Authorities to
Reduce Risk, 22 ENVTL. L. 435 (1992); Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern
Public Lands Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 605 (1991); Victor M. Sher, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and
the Demise of Federal Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,469 (1990). But the elevation of a
single bird species’ needs over the politicians’ will became the signal rallying cry for logging, grazing, and
mining interests in the decade following the plan’s creation—complete with appropriations riders and other
back channel techniques undermining it. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 102-08;
VAUGHN & CORTNER, supra note __ at 202.
223
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effects.224 Even putting development and extractive uses aside, land management that
alters and degrades habitat for some species will almost certainly advantage others.225
Thus, the more we learn about habitat functionality, the more we must choose which
habitat types to try to foster. Native diversity and the restorative work on which it
depends seem to be the most reasonable goals conservation science reveals (although this
is certainly not beyond reasonable doubt).226 But supposing that landscape connectivity
is the single best measure of habitat functionality,227 what comprises such connectivity
remains deeply uncertain for most species.228 And it must be said that updating current
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Cf. Simberloff, supra note __ at 23-25 (describing the halting progression within ecology to the current
belief in the inherent complexity and contingency of species assemblages); KREBS, supra note __ at 11-12
(same).
225
See, e.g., D. Bernardos et al., Wildlife Dynamics in the Changing New England Landscape, in FORESTS
IN TIME: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF 1,000 YEARS OF CHANGE IN NEW ENGLAND 142 (David
R. Foster & John D. Aber eds. 2004). This process is more easily studied in regions like New England
where large-scale habitat alterations track particular historical eras, records of abundance and distribution
(though spotty) at least exist, and inferences can be drawn about habitat alteration as a cause of species
distribution and abundance. Id.
226
JORDAN, supra note __ at 28-53; KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 144-70;
Deborah M. Brosnan & Martha J. Groom, The Integration of Conservation Science and Policy: The Pursuit
of Knowledge Meets the Use of Knowledge, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, supra note __ at
625. The 2000 NFS planning rule preamble went into some detail about the distinction between ecological
restoration tied to “pre-European settlement conditions” versus the maintenance of as much native
biodiversity as possible. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 67543-545. (FWS also acknowledged the distinction in its
“step-down” policy for CCP processes under NWRSIA. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 33904.) What makes the
latter rational (and, perhaps, the former unreasonable) as social goals are the many goods and services
contingent upon biodiversity, see Salzman et al., supra note __, as opposed to the essentially aesthetic
choice of baselines to which reference must be had in most restorative agendas owing to the lack of hard
data. See Andre Clewell & John P. Rieger, What Practitioners Need from Restoration Ecologists, 5
RESTORATION ECOLOGY 350, 350-53 (1997). Under real conditions, though, ecological restoration is
usually something much less comprehensive than the removal of all traces of European civilization.
JORDAN, supra note __ at 197. Of course, under the right circumstances, its aesthetic bases could align it
with the political resilience of preservationism. See Colburn, Localism’s Ecology, supra note __ at *40-43.
227
See Colburn, Indignity, supra note __ at 431-36.
228
See Noss et al., supra note __ at 235 (“Most of the studies documenting deleterious effects of
fragmentation have been carried out in highly fragmented landscapes; in less fragmented landscapes,
results are mixed.”); BENNETT, supra note __ at 5 (“In many ways, the acceptance of corridors as a concept
for biodiversity conservation has outpaced scientific understanding and the collection of empirical data . . .
on the requirements of species and communities and their potential use of linkages. . . . The explosion of
interest in corridors has . . . become a contentious issue.”).
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practices to permit adaptive management finally to work in habitat protection is still more
art than science.229
But the fragmentation is at least as much an issue of law as one of fact.230 While
property lines may be meaningless to the ecologist, they are of singular importance to
landowners, agencies, and the constituencies and politics that control Washington.231
Nevertheless, as experts came to the realization that virtually every kind of preserve
eventually loses species diversity to extirpations,232 the mistake in rejecting what I have
called inclusive conservation became clear. Public lands law’s rejection of conservation
as more than a branch of economics233—its rejection of citizen conservation that fosters
bonds to “ordinary” nature in ordinary places234 and rejection of a pragmatic conception
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Noss et al., supra note __ at 239-40; cf. Ruhl, supra note __ at 31 (“[T]here is good reason to doubt
whether regulation by adaptive management is possible without substantial change in administrative law.”);
Jamison E. Colburn, Trading Spaces: Habitat Mitigation “Banking” Under Fish & Wildlife Service Policy,
20 NAT. RES. & ENV. 33, 34 (Summer 2005) (arguing that bold institutional innovations like market
mechanisms are needed in the protection of habitats for the very kinds of species for which little or no such
innovation is occurring); Holly Doremus, Lessons Learned, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra note __ at 195, 204
(“Frequently, little or no research or data collection effort is expended on a species until after it is listed. . . .
[T]herefore, both the wildlife agencies and the regulated community are working almost in the dark.”).
230
Conservation biologists identify habitat fragmentation as the single most common and most significant
alteration (often, degradation) of habitat. See Reed Noss et al., Habitat Fragmentation, in PRINCIPLES OF
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY at 213, (Martha J. Groom et al. eds., 2005). Fragmentation is both physical, e.g.,
the creation of physical barriers to migration like roads, etc., and jurisdictional, e.g., the prerogative to
manage land very differently across a mosaic of ownerships. But natural patchiness has been linked to
species diversity by some research and, thus, understanding the nature of anthropogenic fragmentation and
predicting its effects on overall habitat functionality is still on the frontiers of ecological research. Id. at
219 (“Spatial heterogeneity and patchy distributions of species in intact landscapes are fragmented, often
confounding predictions of biotic responses to fragmentation. No two landscapes are likely to show
identical trajectories of change.”).
231
See supra notes __ and accompanying text. It bears mentioning that the ESA speaks broadly of
“species,” it limits its attention to those in the plant and animal kingdoms, its “take” prohibitions pertain
only to animal species, see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(C), and its most intensive recovery programs have
skewed tremendously toward “charismatic megafauna.”
232
See Colburn, Indignity, supra note __ at 431-36. “Preserves” in this sense include “critical habitat”
under the ESA. Because the ESA presumptively limits such designations to “specific areas . . . occupied by
the species, at the time it is listed,” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i), restoration to presently unoccupied habitat is
exceptional under the ESA. See Doremus, Importance of Being Wild, supra note __.
233
See supra notes___ and accompanying text.
234
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text.
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of the nature/culture divide—all began to seem quite misguided.235 Yet, since 1964, this
field of law has succeeded most certainly in sustaining conflict over the symbols and
technical grounds raised by long-term planning—not in promoting effective deliberation
about desirable conditions or finding and correcting its own errors.236
The bureaus and boundaries segregating our forests, parks, refuges, wilderness,
and other lands are a lot like the distinctions we draw around the particular animals we
afford moral standing: demonstrably arbitrary, but fixed and powerful nonetheless.237
The difference is that our strategic, conflict-defined national politics block the wide
communication of these mistakes about public lands.238 Conservation advocates clearly
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See, e.g., Symposium: Environmental Restoration: Challenges for the New Millenium, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
183 (2000). Professor Keiter and many others dismiss, with a twinge of regret, the now-famous Quincy
Library Group, an ad hoc coalition of local stakeholders from one county in the California Sierras that
managed to piece together a local consensus-based land use strategy. QLG garnered national acclaim
because it purported to harmonize extractive uses and habitat, doing so as a place-based, problem-solving
body that worked directly with field office personnel in efforts to manage the local units of the national
systems “collaboratively” and independent of centralized priorities. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH
NATURE, supra note __ at 274-310. And this was the cause of its eventual disfavor. “Put simply, its critics
believe the Quincy group represents a narrow community of place, not an extended community of
interests.” Id. at 293. That may be a logical outgrowth of Madison’s “extended republic” and the
Constitution’s conception of federal authority itself. But it is also very a cynical picture of the very form of
place-based conservation politics that has proven the most resilient, durable over the long run, and,
potentially, the most effective. See JORDAN, supra note __ at __; Colburn, Localism’s Ecology, supra note
__. Furthermore, it ignores the experimentalist virtues of allowing a multitude of such arrangements to
develop in the hopes of one of them solving the basic problems confronting such localist initiatives. Id.
236
Thus, while local and regional initiatives lack the scale needed to achieve nationally significant goals,
most of the top national players know they cannot prompt the agencies to actually protect system-wide
biodiversity because of the means the agencies lack. See J. Michael Scott et al., Nature Reserves: Do They
Capture the Full Range of America’s Biological Diversity?, 11 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 999 (2001)
(questioning whether geographic and physiographic characteristics of public lands reserves could even
possibly be sufficient to prevent species loss); NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __ at 205-19 (questioning
the Forest Service’s capacity to practice ecological restoration but not its authority or justifications).
Nevertheless, conflicts in public lands agencies have rarely been managed to enhance those agencies’
capacities. Cf. KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 148 (“Do we know enough about
historical conditions or trajectories of environmental change to set reliable ecological goals? While there
are few easy answers to these questions, they also cannot be avoided if ecological restoration is to play a
meaningful role in the public land policy agenda.”); THOMAS, supra note __ at 20-26 (describing the
deterrents to inter-agency cooperation that inhere in top-down organizational cultures).
237
See supra notes ___ and accompanying text; cf. ROWLANDS, supra note __ at 32-54 (describing
membership in a “moral club” which grants particular animals legal entitlements to humane treatment but
which is irrationally selective in its membership).
238
See Doremus, Best Available Science, supra note __ ;Brunner & Clark, supra note __ at 49; Bosselman
& Tarlock, supra note __ at __. Put the other way around, when all participants in a public debate lay
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have no reason to undermine their own work in the public sphere by arguing that ecology
rejects most of the assumptions underlying Progressive preservation.239 Of course,
mistakes are an inevitable part of public life; their detection and correction is the only
real object of institutional design. Yet developments in ecology and organizational
science have remained peripheral to public lands law, probably because, much of the
time, the developments present nothing of convenience to those few having access to the
means of mass communication.240
Put differently, the meaning of the long history of bounded reserves, mistaken
expert judgments on things like fire and predator suppression, and the differentiation of
land systems—some of the major causes of broad-scale disturbance and species loss—is
lost on conservation politics today notwithstanding its growing clarity to professionals.241

claims to scientific support for their interests or passions, no participant has any incentive to educate
undecideds about how science is actually carried out (or how often the “rational” departs from the
“reasonable”) given the risk that doing so may only serve to dilute one’s own claim to authority.
HABERMAS, supra note __ at 359-79.
239
Cf. SCHELLING, supra note __ at 5 (“To study the strategy of conflict is to take the view that most
conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations. They are situations in which the ability of one
participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other
participant will make.”).
240
This is probably not unique to the public lands agencies. Cf. Tarlock, supra note __ at 1307-18 (arguing
that Army Corps of Engineers can “talk the talk” but “has trouble measuring the value of ecosystem
services, deciding the right geographical planning and management scales for project planning and design,
and is just [now] beginning to experiment with adaptive management.”) Nonetheless, had biogeographic
science actually played a significant role in the public political debate that produced modern public lands
law, the dilemmas Keiter and others have highlighted—what this article has called gridlock at the
intersection of democracy and ecology—might never have arisen. As early as the mid-seventies, seminal
papers setting out the core theses of conservation biology had been published, arguing that species transport
and continued habitat fragmentation (physical and jurisdictional) would produce consistent patterns of
extirpation. See Jared M. Diamond, The Island Dilemma: Lessons of Modern Biogeographic Studies for
the Design of Nature Reserves, 7 BIO. CONSERV. 129 (1975); Daniel S. Simberloff & Lawrence G. Abele,
Island Biogeography Theory and Conservation Practice, 191 SCIENCE 285 (1975); see also Michael E.
Soule & Bruce A. Wilcox, Conservation Biology: Its Scope and Its Challenge, in EVOLUTIONARY
ECOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note ___ at 1 (describing literature that had accumulated in the 1970s
founding the field of conservation biology); HOLLING, supra note __.
241
The PLLRC Report repeatedly acknowledged that “environmental factors” must play a role in land use
planning and that “some uses, entailing severe, often irreversible, impacts, should be permitted only if a
decision is based on a detailed study of their potential impact on the environment.” ONE THIRD OF THE
NATION’S LAND, supra note __ at 80. So far as I could find, though, it never once highlighted the role
agency actions had played in creating the disturbances of public lands ecologists today see as their chief
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The heralded ideal of “ecosystem management” does almost no work in the actual
practice of public lands governance because the public expects to be “served” by experts
who are supposed to protect the public from itself—its factions and their abuses.242 The
national public cannot envision, and is never asked to do, what it will take to achieve
ecosystem management, operating as it does on symbolism alone.243
Pragmatism cannot become an excuse not to innovate around the past’s mistakes.
If our “stewards” have declined to take effective action against threats to biodiversity
originating outside their own jurisdictions, that cannot become a reason to spend still
more capital acquiring or proclaiming more or larger preserves.244 If the systems have

legacy. But see ROBINSON, supra note __ (detailing the role various government agencies played in waging
an extermination campaign on predators); WILLIAMS, supra note __ at 486-87 (describing the gradual
change of mind within the Forest Service on the role of fire in forestry and the rise of the belief that forestry
practices of the early twentieth century had made many forest tracts more susceptible to various risks of
catastrophic loss); KEITER KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __ at 113-26 (identifying the rise of
“ecosystem management” ideals with the “coming of age” of public lands law in the 1980s and 1990s);
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, 21ST ANNUAL REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990)
(same).
Today, even as more and more conservation practitioners acknowledge that land management
planning, to be effective in protecting and restoring habitat, must extend beyond the boundaries of any
particular reserve, must become deliberately experimental and capable of commandeering significant
capital resources as needed, institutional adaptation has never been less of a priority within the Departments
of Interior and Agriculture. See Tony Davis, High Noon For Habitat, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 20,
2006, at 8.
242
Progressivism’s faith in expertise evolved from origins in organized, rational pursuits of the common
good into a belief that “traditional democratic theory” and a sovereign public were “largely untenable.” See
PURCELL, supra note __ at 11. Thus, as the common good was increasingly defined “in terms of
knowledge, efficiency, and scientific planning,” id. at 25, social scientists and political theorists “began to
analyze power as a central element in politics and to deny the importance of less tangible phenomena.” Id.
And, thus, eventually the formalization of the land management systems and the issuance of more
regulations having the force of law came to be identified with progress. “By its very nature, positive law
serves to reduce social complexity. This has been brought home to us . . . by means of the
“deidealizations” in virtue of which legal rules can compensate for the cognitive indeterminacy ,
motivational insecurity, and limited coordinating power of moral norms.” HABERMAS, supra note __ at 326
(emphasis in original). This is not necessarily incompatible with public “participation” in the setting of
such norms, although it certainly confines such participation to a very limited form. See Rossi, supra note
__.
243
Cf. Sunstein, supra note __ at 1739 (“[T]here is a familiar phenomenon of a comfortable and even
emphatic agreement on a general principle, accompanied by sharp disagreement about particular cases.”).
244
The reticence is not because these agencies lack the requisite legal authority. See William J. Lockhart,
External Threats to our National Parks: An Argument for Substantive Protection, 16 STAN. ENV. L.J. 3
(1997). Even when the Park Service has sought to restore habitat of the greater Yellowstone area’s
grizzlies it has met stiff opposition—including from its ‘partner’ in the Interior Department, BLM. See
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failed to articulate any central priorities based upon uniquely qualified insights for
identifying desirable conditions in particular biomes, that cannot be a reason to legislate
still more planning obligations.245 It certainly is no reason to deprive only some
stakeholders of their rights of appeal with an empty plea for their trust.246

B. Toward A Decentralized Public Lands Law?
Tragically, as conservation scientists angle their work toward continuous
adaptation and unbounded conservation, public lands law moves steadily toward
prescribed procedural routines and ever-finer distinctions of use types, creating and
reinforcing more fragmentation, normative discord, and unreasonable expectations of
expertise.247 Quite perversely, while so much was being learned of the systemic effects
of road-dependent development, mechanized extractive industry, fire and predator
suppression, unmanaged recreational access, etc., the nature held up in the public sphere
as worth saving from humanity was still only the authentically wild, sublime nature.248

William J. Lockhart “Faithful Execution” of the Laws Governing Greater Yellowstone: Whose Law?
Whose Priorities?, in THE GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: REDEFINING AMERICA’S WILDERNESS
HERITAGE 49, 58-59 (Robert B. Keiter & Mark S. Boyce eds, 1991).
245
Restoration as a paradigm has always emphasized adaptive management and that, in turn, emphasizes
the paramount importance of local knowledge. See Flournoy, supra note __ at 194-96 & n.34 (linking the
rejection of “local practical knowledge” by “social engineers” to a failure to appreciate complex
functioning orders and citing JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE
THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (1998)); cf. DOWIE, supra note __at 251-57 (contrasting an
environmentalism that is inherently centralizing with one that is inherently noncentralized).
246
HFRA and NEPA Task Force; refute Mortimer argument
247
See supra notes __ and accompanying text. The cumulative result, “atrophy of the public sphere,”
comes about through the “insulation of the state from public demands . . . [t]hrough the passage of a largely
symbolic and administratively discretionary bill [whereby] the political demand is transferred from the
visible public arena to the less-visible bureaucratic agency.” BRULLE, supra note __ at 37.
248
The immovable focus on the “special” even in supposedly scientific conservation programs has been
studied in depth. See Holly Doremus, Biodiversity and the Challenge of Saving the Ordinary, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 325 (2002); Colburn, Indignity, supra note __. What is less studied in public lands law are the
strategic choices its stakeholders and activists have made in framing their campaigns for the special. As
Professor Doremus has argued, “[w]e have a difficult time recognizing the strategy of the special as the
source of the shortcomings of our policy because that strategy comes so naturally to us.” Doremus, supra,
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On reflection, “adaptive-” and “ecosystem management” seem only to have appeared in
public when they could serve as symbols with which to batter other stakeholders—long
after they would have better integrated public lands law.249
The warped endgame is that the domain of laws like the ESA will continue to
expand because truly integrative mechanisms of habitat connectivity are essentially
foreclosed for too many species by any other means.250 Even supposing the local or
regional managers of federal property units have the authority to manage them not as
elements of their national “systems” but as locally situated, locally significant agents of

at 343. Future research in this field will take it as given that its stakeholders have strategic incentives to
over-utilize the conservation/preservation dichotomy in public communications.
249
See Grumbine, supra note __ at 29 (linking the spread of talk about ecosystem management to
“sociopolitical” trends and the fact that “many citizens are asking for less development of ecosystems and
more protection and restoration.”); cf. Simberloff, supra note __ at 29 (“[One] attraction of the ecosystem is
that it lends itself to . . . the glamor of turning ecology into space-age science, replete with the terminology
of engineering and physics, [and this] must itself been a powerful inducement of the ecosystem approach,
fitting hand-in-glove with the economic appeal.”). In the end, “[p]rivileged access to the sources of relevant
knowledge makes possible an inconspicuous domination over the [public] cut off from these sources and
placated with symbolic politics.” HABERMAS, supra note__ at 317. But this is a failing of the legal system,
too. Cf. Sunstein, supra note __ at 1771(“A key task for a legal system is to enable people who disagree on
first principles to converge on outcomes in particular cases.”).
250
See Mark L. Shaffer et al., Proactive Habitat Conservation, in ESA AT THIRTY, supra note _- at 286,
288-92; cf. NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __ at 27 (“The continually expanding list of endangered
species and ongoing degradation of entire ecosystems is proof enough that current approaches to
conservation are flawed.”). Of course, while the ESA itself declares one of its purposes to be the creation of
“means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species may be
conserved,” 16 U.S.C. 1531(b), “the agencies have never taken this ecosystem protection mandate
seriously, and Congress has never told them how they might do so.” NOSS & COOPERRIDER, supra note __
at 27. What is perhaps surprising in this connection, though, is that some participants in the public lands
law debate that preceded the ESA made the same point.
To conceive an ecosystems approach to public land policy, one must have first arrived at an
ecological viewpoint toward the world of man and nature. But this is not the viewpoint from
which pioneers, land speculators, farmers, miners, stockmen, lawyers, bankers, or local
government officials, have commonly seen the land. To institute an ecosystems approach to
public land policy, a great many other things besides land must be considered. An ecosystems
approach is essentially a total systems approach. . . . It would impose constraints upon single
purpose approaches to the environment and would arouse hostility among individuals whose
single purpose pursuits would thereby be constrained.
Lynton K. Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Lands Policy, 10 NAT. RES. J. 203, 205
(1970). Even more ironically, some of the PLLRC’s own staff research had argued as much about public
lands law. See Ira Michael Heyman & Robert H. Twiss, Environmental Management of the Public Lands,
1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 94, 132, 137-39 (1971).
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landscape scale, regionally-constructive conservation,251 there is little reason to think they
have the financial or institutional support to do so.252
As statutory reform comes over the horizon, the paradox sharpens in our public
lexicon of public lands. In stark contrast with what hit Washington from 1964-76,253
there has been (and likely will be) no real political muscle pushing the tradeoffs that must
be made to protect more ordinary nature or to institutionalize adaptive management.254
Notwithstanding the advances in ecology and conservation biology,255 too many
“environmentalists” still reject ecological restoration and too many still find leverage to
be gotten by playing to latent hopes of saving the authentically wild. In the process, they
reject a model of public lands that would uncouple them from professionals, national
political capital, and legal procedure; a model that would put our parcels of public land in
the hands of place-based volunteers and local definitions of desirable conditions and
desirable regional ordering; a model for the incremental reintegration of humanity and
nature.256
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This is obviously an agency-by-agency, statute-by-statute question. But, for example,
Craig Thomas,
253
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
254
See Mark T. Imperial, Institutional Analysis and Ecosystem-Based Management: The Institutional
Analysis and Development Framework, 24 J. ENV. MGMNT. 449 (1999) (describing the gradual rise of
“ecosystem management” as a public policy); Grumbine, supra note __; Ruhl, supra note __ at 46-49.
255
See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
256
As a conservation strategy, restoration has been defined as everything done to a “landscape or
ecosystem in an ongoing attempt to compensate for novel or “outside” influences on it in such a way that it
can continue to behave or can resume behaving as if these were not present.” JORDAN, supra note __ at 22.
It is this ideal—dependent as it is on active management and indifferent as it is to pedestalizing places that
have had comparatively few “outside” influences—that was rejected by “environmentalists” in the
formative period of public lands law 1964-76. That is a move some have cogently argued was “one of the
defining mistakes of twentieth-century environmentalism.” Id. at 17.
252
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C. Conclusions
With ideological conflict the norm and the preservation of the authentically wild
being, in the public’s mind, the saving of nature, public advocacy transcending the
outmoded thinking of Progressivism remains rare. Even now when the full scope of the
species loss pandemic is becoming clear, leading academics still stop on the “dilemma”
of intermixed ownership and interspersed jurisdictions to critique the “failures” of
Presidents and Congresses in not synthesizing truly systematic federal systems of public
conservation.257 But a significantly different outcome from our constitutional system is
scarcely imaginable. Once the political vocabulary was invented distinguishing
“conservation” from “preservation,” driving the legislation of our administrative state, the
resulting patterns traced above were, if not inevitable, unsurprising. Too much of our
legal culture is predicated on the perceived virtue of dividing land among atomized
selves.258 That predicate has organized our public domain since the founding259 and
Progressive era conservation only reinforced it with the confidence of expertise.260 The
bold innovations that will turn this weakness into a strength for conservationism are still
missing from the public debate about public lands law.
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See KEITER, KEEPING FAITH WITH NATURE, supra note __at 206-15; Robert L. Fischman, The Problem
of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment Legislation and its Relationship to Pollution Control
Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 779, 783 (1997) (“[T]he trend of increasing congressional management through
establishment legislation thwarts efforts to manage the national park system as a system rather than a mere
collection of lands.”); Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, supra note __ at PINCITE; Tarlock, supra note
__ at 1319-20 (critiquing the practice of congressional oversight of Corps of Engineers by appropriations
earmarks and other project-specific legislation).
258
See supra notes __ and accompanying text.
259
See Raymond & Fairfax, supra note __; Appel, supra note __ at __.
260
“The breadth of power conferred by the Property Clause as presently interpreted suggests that Congress
or the Executive could, if it wished, take a more protective approach to federal property despite otherwise
applicable state law.” Appel, supra note __ at 5. It can no longer be argued that the Constitution is holding
the federal government back: the Property Clause houses more than enough authority to adopt such a
restorative, integrative approach. Appel; Lockhart; FISCHMAN
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Derek Walcott is reported to have once said that if you break a vase, “the love that
reassembles the fragments is stronger than the love that took its symmetry for granted
when it was whole.”261 A real restoration agenda for public lands can only come from
those volunteers and neighbors who work collectively to reassemble a whole through
their love of place.
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Derek Walcott, The Antilles: Fragments of Epic Memory (Nobel Prize acceptance speech), NEW
REPUBLIC, Dec. 28, 1992.
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